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INTRODUCTION 
In late 2005 and early 2006, top executives of broadband provid-
ers indicated that they plan to charge a fee to Internet application 
companies like Google, Yahoo!, and Vonage, for access to consumers’ 
homes through new “managed and secure” fiberoptic networks.  Mul-
tiple broadband providers have expressed support for the plan to 
charge Internet application companies for assured fast and priority 
delivery over the Internet.1  Broadband providers assure consumers 
that they will not block their networks from Internet application com-
panies that do not pay the access fee.  However, in an age where more 
and more applications—such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), 
music and video delivery, and online gaming—are time sensitive, the 
inability to pay such a fee and the subsequent penalty of slower deliv-
ery may effectively block an Internet application company from pro-
viding content. 
Broadband providers argue that they made an investment in cable 
and DSL infrastructure and that Internet application companies are 
free riding on their “pipes.”2  On the other hand, Internet application 
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1 See Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet 
Fees:  Content Providers May Face Charges for Fast Access; Billing the Consumer Twice?, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at A1 (reporting on BellSouth’s negotiations with Movielink to 
“guarantee fast content delivery over the Internet,” and on AT&T and Verizon’s sup-
port of such a fee system). 
2 Networks are becoming increasingly crowded and network operators are “trying 
to prioritize Internet traffic to meet increasing demand” for time-sensitive applica-
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companies contend that the customer is already paying for the band-
width and that broadband providers are using their power in the local 
high speed Internet access market to extort fees from application 
companies.3
Framing the current debate is the principle of “network neutral-
ity” (NN), which generally holds that Internet data packets should 
move nondiscriminatorily (that is, without restrictions or limitations 
imposed by a broadband provider).  If a “pay-to-play” policy for high 
speed Internet is adopted, there is an enormous risk that end-to-end 
(e2e) innovation,4 one of the great benefits of the Internet, will be 
swallowed into a centralized system of protocols determining which 
Internet applications receive priority and, thus, enhanced exposure to 
users. 
This Comment focuses on one Internet application that will be di-
rectly affected by the proposed broadband pricing policy:  Voice over 
Internet Protocol.  Although not a new concept, VoIP has begun to 
proliferate only during the last few years.  Internet companies such as 
Vonage have used the technology to substantially reduce the cost of 
tions.  Id.  SBC Chairman Edward E. Whitacre Jr. contends that broadband providers 
have spent large amounts of capital—and will spend an additional $4 billion—on lay-
ing fiberoptic networks and that in order to obtain a return on their investment, 
Internet application companies will have to “‘pay for the portion they’re using.’”  Ar-
shad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at D1; see 
also Online Extra:  At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope”, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm?chan=gl 
(quoting Whitacre’s comment that “the cable companies have made an investment 
and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes for free 
is nuts!”). 
3 Vonage Chairman Jeffrey Citron compares the attitude of SBC to “UPS demand-
ing [that] the sender and the recipient of a package both pay for delivery.” Moham-
med, supra note 2, at D1 (paraphrasing Citron’s comments).  He argues that it is “‘lu-
dicrous’” for any broadband provider to “‘get paid twice on the same service.’”  Id. 
(quoting Citron); see also Searcey & Schatz, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that 
Vonage’s Citron believes that the system will ultimately cause the consumer to pay 
twice for broadband access).  Additionally, Paul Misener, Amazon.com’s Vice President 
for Global Public Policy, argues that, since most consumers have limited choices for 
broadband Internet access, broadband providers have “‘if not monopoly, then du-
opoly’” power.  Mohammed, supra note 2 (quoting Misener). 
4 The e2e principle is a theory of innovation that “rejects centralized, planned in-
novation, and holds that the greatest rate of technological development is driven by 
delegating decisional authority to the decentralized ‘ends’ of any network.”  Tim Wu, 
The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 74 (2004).  
The principle results from the fact that “the ‘ends’ of the network are numerous, or 
nearly unlimited, and delegating authority to the ends opens the door to more ap-
proaches to a given technological challenge.”  Id. 
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telephone service for consumers.5  Many broadband providers have 
recently started to offer VoIP services themselves, including Verizon’s 
VoiceWing, AT&T’s CallVantage, and Comcast’s Digital Voice.6  How-
ever, as a result of broadband providers’ control over the last mile of 
the network, every VoIP competitor will have to pay a surcharge in or-
der to ensure timely delivery of the information packets necessary for 
VoIP to function.  As early as March 2004, market analysts predicted 
that Vonage would be driven from the market by this anticompetitive 
pay-to-play system: 
It may seem like a dodgy competitive tactic, but broadband network op-
erators could slow down Vonage’s service.  As subscribers increase their 
use of latency sensitive and graphic-rich IP traffic, broadband providers 
could give network precedence to their own revenue-generating services.  
Unless Vonage pays fees to the network provider, there is no reason the 
operator should not make the service a lower priority on the network.
7
Thus, broadband providers’ VoIP services will always maintain a sig-
nificant competitive advantage over non-broadband VoIP services, not 
because of the merits of their services, but because of the additional 
fee they can require competitors to pay. 
This Comment argues that the pay-to-play tactics proposed by 
broadband providers have significant anticompetitive effects that may 
violate United States antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.  Some 
commentators suggest that the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should regulate the 
Internet using an “antitrust-like” approach, in order to avoid competi-
tive harms before they occur.  Although this approach has strong 
merit and could seamlessly incorporate the principles articulated in 
this Comment, the current regulatory policy remains hands-off.  Thus, 
in the time period between the present deregulation of the broad-
band market and the competitive ideal of the future, there is a need 
for an interim solution to protect innovation.  I argue that a court-
5 Traditional telephone services charge customers primarily based on the duration 
of the call and on the distance between the call participants.  The Meaning of Free Speech, 
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, at 69, 70.  However, these factors “are simply irrele-
vant with VoIP.”  Id. 
6 Martin Perez, Study:  VoIP Call Quality Getting a Bit Better, VOIP-NEWS, Sept. 22, 
2006, http://www.voip-news.com/news/study-quality-cable-092206 (describing the re-
sults of a VoIP provider call-quality study including Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast). 
7 Daniel Klein, Why Vonage Is Just a Fad, ZDNET, May 19, 2004, http:// 
www.techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/Why_Vonage_Just_Fad.html. 
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enforced, case-by-case antitrust framework would provide that solu-
tion, and that it is thus important today to articulate such liability. 
Part I of this Comment explains how time-sensitive applications 
such as VoIP work and what makes them vulnerable to a pay-to-play 
priority distribution system.  Part II describes the potential effects that 
a pay-to-play system would have on innovation in the application mar-
kets.  Part III discusses three potential government responses to the 
pay-to-play system.  Finally, Part IV examines the antitrust doctrines 
that a pay-to-play system might violate. 
I.  HOW TIME-SENSITIVE APPLICATIONS WORK:  WHAT IS VOIP? 
As the name VoIP expresses, the technology “transmits voice over 
the Internet in the form of Internet protocol.”8  Other Internet 
transmissions, including e-mail, video, and Web surfing, use similar 
transmission protocols.9  VoIP converts a user’s voice into digital bits 
and organizes them into thousands of “packets.”10  Each voice packet 
is “individually addressed [to the intended recipient] and sent over 
[the] physical networks” of broadband providers.11  However, unlike 
traditional public, switched telephone networks, in which a voice 
transmission takes  a “‘permanent or exclusive’ path from its sender to 
its recipient,” Internet routers “read packet addresses individually and 
decide the optimal path of transmission for each packet.”12  Thus, de-
spite the perceived “constancy” of a fixed connection between the 
conversing individuals, a VoIP transmission allows the voice packets to 
take a variety of routes to the same final destination.13  Upon arrival of 
the individual voice packets, the participant’s computer aggregates 
and reassembles them into a coherent conversation.14  Through this 
method of transmission, “VoIP can carry significantly more informa-
8 Jared S. Dinkes, Note, Rethinking the Revolution:  Competitive Telephony in a Voice 
over Internet Protocol Era, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 833, 840 (2005). 
9 Id. (“[VoIP’s] transmission is essentially no different from other forms of infor-
mation transmitted over the internet . . . .”). 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  The physical networks “may be composed of copper, fiber, coaxial cable, or 
wireless facilities.”  Id. 
12 Id. at 841.  If a portion of a network is malfunctioning, routers are able to rec-
ognize the disturbance and “seek an alternate path for the packets to travel.”  Id. 
13 Id. at 840-41. 
14 Id. at 841. 
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tion in a more efficient manner than analog transmission” over fixed 
telephone lines.15
What differentiates VoIP from traditional Internet applications, 
such as e-mail and instant messaging, is the time-sensitive nature of 
packet delivery.  When sending and receiving an e-mail, a one-second 
delay of a digital packet is usually undetectable by the user.  However, 
when using the Internet to transmit voice or video, even a tenth-of-a-
second delay could destroy the usefulness of the application.16  Thus, 
with the increased use of the Internet for voice communication, video 
and music downloading, and gaming, there is considerable consumer 
demand for reliable and speedy packet delivery.17  To meet this in-
creased demand, broadband providers are upgrading their networks.18
II.  PAY-TO-PLAY:  EFFECTS ON INNOVATION 
To date, broadband providers have generated income streams di-
rectly from consumers.  Many providers price discriminate between 
residential and commercial users of their networks.19  In addition, in 
order to ensure network quality and speed, providers often limit con-
sumer bandwidth20 or base their charges on bandwidth usage.21  Al-
15 Id. 
16 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 148 (2003) (stating that a delay of a few milliseconds “certainly 
matters for applications that want to carry voice or video”).  Although invented in the 
early 1990s, VoIP was not a viable technology during the “narrow band” dial-up era of 
the Internet.  In 2004, many engineers still incorrectly believed that the technology 
could not be supported on the present broadband networks.  See Wu, supra note 4, at 
71-72 (discussing the various reasons for the delay of widespread consumer use of 
VoIP). 
17 See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or 
Hurt Competition?  A Comment on the End-To-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 23, 35 (2004) (noting that “[b]andwidth-hungry applications . . . are placing 
increasing pressure on network capacity”). 
18 In addition to upgrading their networks to meet the growing demand for time-
sensitive applications, many broadband providers are considering the use of “‘policy-
based routers,’ which can discriminate among packets and assign them different levels 
of priority, depending on the source of the packet or the nature of the application be-
ing run.”  Id. at 36.  For a discussion of the policy issues behind “policy-based routers,” 
see infra Part II.B.1. 
19 See Searcey & Schatz, supra note 1 (“Cable and phone companies have already 
started offering multitiered pricing of broadband for consumers.”). 
20 See Wu, supra note 16, at 158-62 (outlining broadband usage restrictions); Sear-
cey & Schatz, supra note 1 (describing some cable companies’ intentions to prevent 
“broadband customers from using too much bandwidth”). 
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though commentators disagree about whether consumer pricing 
based on bandwidth usage protects the open nature of the Internet 
and permits innovation on the “ends” of the network,22 differing pric-
ing levels—residential as opposed to commercial—based on band-
width usage has been the industry norm.23  However, recent pay-to-
play musings by broadband providers violate many of the principles of 
NN and present serious risks, including stifling innovation. 
A.  Network Neutrality Promotes Innovation 
Generally, the principle underlying NN focuses on the impor-
tance of protecting the ability of Internet users to access Web content 
and to use Internet applications without limitation or restriction by 
broadband providers.  Academic promoters of the NN principle, like 
Tim Wu, seek to “preserv[e] a Darwinian competition among every 
conceivable use of the Internet so that . . . only the best survive.”24  Al-
though commentators disagree on the best method of preserving 
NN—most notably on the “dumb” versus “smart” pipe debate25—most, 
if not all, agree that preserving Internet innovation as the basis of 
“economic growth” is a principal goal.26  Both sides of the debate view 
21 See Yoo, supra note 17, at 36 (“[M]any last-mile providers either forbid end users 
to use bandwidth-intensive applications . . . or instead require that they pay higher 
charges before doing so.”). 
22 Compare id. at 27-28 (suggesting that broadband providers could “differentiate” 
their networks to “serv[e] the needs” of different subgroups, with “one optimizing its 
network for conventional Internet applications such as e-mail and website access, an-
other incorporating security features to facilitate e-commerce, [and] a third employing 
routers that prioritize packets in the manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applica-
tions”), with Wu, supra note 16, at 152-53 (arguing that, although “mainstream antitrust 
analysis has come to see [it] as generally uncontentious,” price discrimination may 
have unfortunate, “dynamic consequences for the competitive development of new 
applications”). 
23 See Wu, supra note 16, at 160-61 (describing the limitations broadband providers 
place on “commercial use” of “residential broadband connections”). 
24 Id.  at 142. 
25 “Openists,” those in favor of a “dumb pipe,” believe that innovation and “tech-
nological development” are driven by decentralizing authority and delegating it to the 
“ends” of the network.  Wu, supra note 4, at 74.  They see “fast and reliable connec-
tion[s]” as a service that “must not discriminate as between uses, users, or content.”  Id. 
at 72-73.  “Deregulationists,” those in favor of a “smart pipe,” have a contrasting view of 
“media convergence” onto a single “smart pipe” that has the ability to distinguish be-
tween those applications that are time sensitive and those that are not.  Id. at 75-76.  
They believe that the enormous incentives to provide bundled media and communica-
tions will drive innovation and growth.  Id. at 76-77. 
26 See id. at 80 (discussing the “Shared Economic Faiths” of the two principal NN 
approaches). 
  
2007] VOIP AND PAY-TO-PLAY 1311 
 
innovation, including “new companies, new services, and new prod-
ucts,” and “not price competition,” as the “principle driver of eco-
nomic growth” and increased efficiency. 27
In order to protect such innovation, proposed NN rules create 
rights for Internet users.  For example, a recently proposed rule reads: 
(b) General Right of Unrestricted Network Usage.  Broadband Users have the 
right to use their Internet connection in ways which [are] not unlawful 
or harmful to the network.  Accordingly neither Broadband Operators 
nor the Federal Communications Commission shall impose restrictions 
on the use of an Internet connection except as necessary to:  [prevent 
uses illegal under statute or uses harmful to the network].28
In August 2005, the FCC adopted four NN principles29 based on 
the fundamental proposition “that consumers should be able to use 
their broadband internet access service to access any content on the 
internet.”30
These proposed and adopted NN rules and principles are at-
tempts to form a “pre-commitment rule for both government and in-
dustry . . . prevent[ing] now what may be temptations tomorrow.”31  
From the industry’s point of view, NN rules and principles offer sig-
nificant value to broadband providers by preventing the government 
“from blocking [broadband provider] entry into the application mar-
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 88 (citing the latest iteration of a proposed rule that was initially submit-
ted to the FCC in Letter from Tim Wu, Associate Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law & 
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marleen H. Dorth, Sec’y, FCC 
(Aug. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from Wu & Lessig], available at http://www.freepress.net/ 
docs/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
29 For a list of these four principles, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.  
Prior to the official adoption of these principles, former FCC Chairman Michael Pow-
ell had articulated and published his own view of the four freedoms to which all Inter-
net users are entitled.  Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom:  Guiding Principles 
for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004) (enumerating the 
four “Internet Freedoms”:  (1) “freedom to access content,” (2) “freedom to use appli-
cations,” (3) “freedom to attach personal devices,” and (4) “freedom to obtain service 
plan information”).
30 Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy 
Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.lasarletter.com/2005/docs/ 
martin_netneutrality.pdf; see also Policy Statement, In re Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 
(F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (indicating that “broadband networks [should be] widely de-
ployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers”).  Congress is considering a 
bill that would give the FCC “exclusive authority to adjudicate any complaint alleging a 
violation of the broadband policy statement” of August 5, 2005.  H.R. 5252, 109th 
Cong. § 201 (2006). 
31 Wu, supra note 4, at 89 (emphasis added). 
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ket,”32 and thus protecting broadband providers’ ability to offer “com-
petitive, vertically integrated applications themselves.”33  From the 
government’s point of view, the NN rules and principles protect mar-
ket entry by “creat[ing] a structural bias that favors entry of any 
player . . . into the market for consumer usage of the Internet.”34
Fundamentally, the NN rules and principles “are designed to 
make the Vonage story repeat itself.”35  Vonage is an archetype of a 
new company driving innovation.  In the 1990s, VoIP was often dis-
cussed within the broadband community and the media, though it was 
seldom deployed.36  When broadband providers were asked when 
VoIP would be available to the general consuming public, “the answer 
was always ‘not quite yet.’”37  Those questioning the viability of VoIP 
argued that, “without substantial network improvements,” the con-
suming American public would refuse to purchase such an “inconsis-
tent” technology.38  Both DSL and cable providers were reluctant to 
take significant steps toward a VoIP rollout.39  DSL providers, the most 
prominent of which were Bell companies, feared “cannibaliz[ing] the 
industry’s most profitable [phone] service,”40 and cable broadband 
providers likely feared sparking a DSL entry into “residential video.”41
In 2003, however, instead of cooperating with the reluctant 
broadband providers, Vonage sold VoIP service straight to consum-
ers.42  By selling a phone that plugged into the network, Vonage 
avoided broadband providers altogether and charged “a fraction of” 
the traditional telephone network cost.43  During a time of uncertainty 
32 Id.  “If the users have the right to access lawful applications and content, that 
includes those provided by the operator itself.”  Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (emphasis added). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 71. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 71-72. 
39 See CHARLES H. FERGUSON, BROOKINGS INST., POLICY BRIEF #105:  THE U.S. 
BROADBAND PROBLEM 1, 5 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he slow pace of improvement in 
broadband services is not surprising,” since “[n]either industry would logically be in-
terested in provoking highly dynamic competition in open-architecture, high-speed, 
and/or symmetric broadband services to either businesses or homes”). 
40 Wu, supra note 4, at 72. 
41 FERGUSON, supra note 39, at 5. 
42 Wu, supra note 4, at 72.  By September 2005, Vonage had over one million U.S. 
customers.  Press Release, Vonage, Vonage Says, “Thanks a Million America” (Sept. 12, 
2005), http://www.vonage.com/media/pdf/pr_09_12_05.pdf. 
43 Wu, supra note 4, at 72. 
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about the future of VoIP, Vonage “offered what everyone said no one 
would buy.”44  Without a company like Vonage to drive innovation, 
“VoIP would have arrived on the carrier’s schedule:  later or perhaps 
never.”45
The “structural bias” of the Internet, which currently favors market 
entry, made the Vonage story possible.46  Even if Vonage is eventually 
pushed out of the market as a result of competition—as many predict 
it will be47—it will have succeeded in moving the entire network for-
ward by bringing innovation to market.48
B.  Pay-To-Play Destroys Network Neutrality 
A pay-to-play policy contravenes both the NN rules and the FCC 
principles and would act as a preclusive barrier to new and innovative 
Internet application companies. 
1.  The Shift from Nondiscriminatory Protocols  
to Discriminatory “Smart Pipes” 
First, in order to make a pay-to-play policy policeable, broadband 
providers must continue their departure from the nondiscriminatory 
and largely anonymous TCP/IP framework49 to “smart pipes” with the 
ability to identify and discriminate among packets based on their 
sources.  “Openists,” who believe that broadband networks “should be 
kept ‘dumb’ and should focus solely on passing along packets as 
quickly as possible,” are reluctant to accept such a departure from 
TCP/IP.50
Pragmatists like Adam Thierer recognize the potential competitive 
dangers of discriminatory broadband networks, but also identify sev-
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Wu, supra note 4, at 89.  As the CEOs of Google, Microsoft, Intel, and several 
other major technology companies put it, “‘innovation without permission’ represents 
‘the essence of the Internet.’”  ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND., A “THIRD WAY” ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY 5 (2006), 
http://itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf. 
47 See infra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that it is unlikely that inde-
pendent providers will continue to dominate the VoIP market). 
48 Wu, supra note 4, at 89. 
49 TCP/IP “routes all packets in a nondiscriminatory (i.e., first come, first served) 
manner without regard to the packet’s content, point of origin, or associated applica-
tion.”  Yoo, supra note 17, at 33. 
50 Id. at 41. 
  
1314 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1305 
 
eral “smart pipe” benefits that could ultimately improve the quality 
and efficiency of networks.51  Those benefits include quality-service 
assurances,52 network integrity, increased security,53 and the ability to 
meet the demands of law enforcement.54
The introduction of technology capable of discrimination must be 
undertaken with care.  Along with the ability to “discriminate among 
packets” comes the power to “assign them different levels of priority, 
depending on the source of the packet or the nature of the applica-
tion being run.”55  Internet application companies fear that misuse of 
this power would stifle rival competition and innovative applications.56  
Actions taken under the guise of preserving “quality service” may ac-
tually be anticompetitive tactics to slow down rival applications.  Addi-
tionally, since a broadband provider’s network control would be pro-
prietary, “degrading service by introducing delays or dropping 
occasional calls [would be] difficult to prove.”57  Therefore, largely 
51 See Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy?  Vertical Integra-
tion, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
275, 278, 292-96 (2005) (arguing that “‘openness’ and (semi-)dumb pipes will likely 
prevail naturally in the marketplace”). 
52 Seeking “to ensure steady traffic flows” by either “curb[ing] excessive band-
width usage by some users, or at least price discriminat[ing] to encourage bandwidth 
conservation” would benefit the entire network.  See id. at 296 (describing these ap-
proaches). 
53 Many Internet “end users have become increasingly frustrated by intrusions 
thrust upon them by other end users.”  Yoo, supra note 17, at 36-37.  Forms of intru-
sion, “such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses . . . and programs that mine cookies for 
private information,” threaten network integrity.  Id. at 37 (detailing various “mali-
cious” intrusions on Internet usage and the reactions of consumers).  Subscribers ex-
pect and demand that their broadband provider take protective measures “to prevent 
viruses or block excessive Spam.”  Thierer, supra note 51, at 296. 
54 Under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), law 
enforcement agencies must have the ability to place wiretaps on Internet phone calls.  
See Yoo, supra note 17, at 37 (“CALEA . . . requires that all telecommunications carriers 
configure their networks in a way that permits law enforcement . . . to place wiretaps 
on telephone calls.”). 
55 Id. at 36. 
56 For example, in November 2004, Nuvio Corporation, a small VoIP provider based 
in Kansas City, filed a request with the FCC to “prohibit[] providers of broadband con-
nections . . . from degrading third-party offerings in an attempt to gain a competitive ad-
vantage.”  Alan Breznick, VoIP Provider Presses FCC To Block Broadband Discrimination, CA-
BLE DIGITAL NEWS, Nov. 1, 2004 (on file with author); see also Donny Jackson, Nuvio Seeks 
Non-discriminatory Broadband for VoIP, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2004, 
http://telephonyonline.com/broadband/web/telecom_nuvio_seeks_nondiscriminatory. 
57 Jonathan Krim, Phone Company Settles in Blocking of Internet Calls, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 4, 2005, at E2 (citing Nuvio CEO Jason P. Talley). 
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undetectable discriminatory protocols give broadband providers the 
power to interrupt rivals’ time-sensitive applications. 
Thus, although the increased intelligence of networks and “semi-
smart pipes” may increase network efficiency and safety, the shift away 
from an anonymous and nondiscriminatory network may also create 
significant competitive dangers.  Specifically, in an anticompetitive 
environment in which broadband providers control the reliability and 
consistency of a rival’s application, there will be disincentives for new 
companies to create innovative applications. 
2.  The Inability of Innovators To Pay 
Pay-to-play policies have an additional, even more obvious, risk to 
potential Internet innovators:  new start-up companies with innovative 
applications might not be able to afford the premium for assured 
packet delivery.  Although broadband providers claim they will not 
become “Internet gatekeepers” because they will not technically block 
consumer access to applications,58 a pay-to-play policy would effectively 
block any Internet company whose application requires time-sensitive 
packet delivery.59  Particularly since Internet application companies 
already must pay broadband providers large fees for bandwidth, pay-
ment of an additional fee “would be very damaging” for many start-up 
companies.60  In addition, venture capitalists would find “fewer new 
businesses worthy of investment if the phone and cable companies are 
allowed to favor one business over another.”61
A pay-to-play system would create significant barriers to entry for 
future time-sensitive applications, thus foreclosing many innovative 
58 See Mohammed, supra note 2 (quoting SBC spokesman Michael Balmoris as say-
ing that “SBC has not and will not block or limit access to lawful content or applica-
tions on the Internet”). 
59 Thus, current video, voice, or music applications would be affected by the pay-
to-play policy.  Additionally, there would be a chilling effect on the incentive to re-
search and develop innovations like Internet computing—running all PC functions on 
a central processor over the Internet—if packets could not be be guaranteed timely 
delivery without payment. 
60 Internet Debate:  Preserving User Parity (Nat’l Pub. Radio Broadcast Apr. 25, 2006) 
(comments of Josh Felser, CEO of Grouper.com); see also ATKINSON & WEISER, supra 
note 46, at 5 (recognizing that “an Internet where an innovator has to ask permission 
(and pay potentially significant fees) before deploying a new technology threatens the 
Internet’s golden goose of allowing innovation over an open platform”). 
61 Internet Debate, supra note 60 (citing the concerns of Gary Morganthaler, general 
partner in the venture capital firm Morganthaler Ventures). 
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Internet application companies from competing with broadband pro-
viders on the merits of their services. 
3.  The Result:  Disincentive To Innovate 
The combination of a discriminatory protocol and a barrier to en-
try for time-sensitive applications would create a potentially dangerous 
result:  innovators on the “ends” of the network might choose not to 
develop new applications. 
A pay-to-play system would create an enormous disincentive to a 
rational innovator or venture capitalist who is deciding whether to de-
velop or fund a new Internet application.  Lawrence Lessig and Tim 
Wu suggest that even comments by broadband providers’ top execu-
tives about the possibility of implementing a pay-to-play system can 
have a detrimental effect on innovation:  “If the innovation is likely to 
excite an incentive to discrimination, and such discrimination could 
occur, then the mere potential imposes a burden on innovation today 
whether or not there is discrimination now.  The possibility of dis-
crimination in the future dampens the incentives to invest today.”62
Many of the participants in the present pay-to-play debate focus 
too narrowly on protecting independent VoIP providers from bank-
ruptcy.  However, it is likely that Vonage and other independent VoIP 
companies will not survive competition with the large broadband pro-
viders.63
The crucial element to protect in this debate is Vonage’s role as 
an innovation catalyst, a company that succeeded in moving the entire 
network forward.  Vonage’s role in promoting innovation must be rep-
licable by others in the future.  However, a pay-to-play policy for as-
sured delivery of time-sensitive packets would inhibit the potential for 
innovation provided by a more neutral network model.  Thus, future 
innovations would be stifled long before they could reach the market. 
62 Letter from Wu & Lessig, supra note 28, at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
63 Although independent VoIP companies have created a significant consumer 
base due to their first-mover advantage, “it is unlikely that they will retain their domi-
nant market share because the traditional telecom industry leaders and ISPs have 
more resources and brand power.”  Sunny Lu, Cellco Partnership v. FCC & Vonage 
Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Comm’n:  VoIP’s Shifting Legal and Political 
Landscape, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 859, 867 (2005).  In addition, cable broadband pro-
viders will be able to offer the “‘triple play’ of broadband Internet connection, cable 
[television] and now VoIP,” providing the consumer with the convenience of having 
“one provider and paying one bill.”  R. Alex DuFour, Voice over Internet Protocol:  Ending 
Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CON-
SPECTUS 471, 476 (2005). 
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III.  POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE PAY-TO-PLAY PROBLEM 
Part II examined the dangers that a pay-to-play system poses to 
Internet innovation.  This Part focuses on the potential responses 
from government and individuals. 
A.  Regulation:  Broadband as an “Information Service” 
Traditionally, telecommunications have been heavily regulated by 
the FCC.64  But in an attempt to increase competition in the provision 
of broadband services, the FCC has taken a “lighter regulatory 
touch.”65  Thus, it is likely that the FCC will not react to remedy the 
potential harms of a pay-to-play system. 
In March 2002, the FCC concluded that cable broadband service 
is an “information service,” and not a “telecommunications service,”66 
and thus is exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation under 
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.67  In August 2005, the 
FCC reclassified the provision of DSL broadband as an “information 
service” as well.68
On the same day as the DSL reclassification, the FCC adopted 
four principles in order “[t]o encourage broadband deployment and 
64 See Dinkes, supra note 8, at 844-57 (providing a brief history of regulation of tra-
ditional public switched telephone networks). 
65 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,856 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report order and notice of 
proposed rulemaking); see also Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,222 (Oct. 17, 2005) (final rule) (re-
moving many previous regulatory impediments). 
66 Press Release, FCC, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as “Information Ser-
vice” (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-220835A1.pdf.  The FCC’s decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 
(2005). 
67 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46) (2000) (defining “information service” and “tele-
communications service,” the latter of which is subject to mandatory Title II regula-
tion). 
68 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,223; see also Marguerite Reardon, FCC Changes DSL Classification, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 5, 2005, http://news.com.com/FCC+changes+DSL+classification/ 
2100-1034_3-5820713.html (describing the reclassification process).  Even though nei-
ther cable nor DSL broadband providers are subject to mandatory Title II regulation, 
the FCC “has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I 
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications.”  Brand X 
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161). 
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preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the 
public Internet”:69
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their 
choice . . . (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and use ser-
vices of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement . . . (3) 
consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do 
not harm the network . . . (4) consumers are entitled to competition 
among network providers, application and service providers, and con-
tent providers.
70
However, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin made it clear that the 
policy statements “do not establish rules nor are they enforceable 
documents.”71  In statements to the press, Martin has been noncom-
mittal toward enforcing the “four principles” against broadband pro-
viders who implement a pay-to-play policy.72
The primary purpose of relieving both cable and DSL providers 
from the mandatory Title II regulation is to increase competition be-
tween the two platforms on a level playing field.73  In addition, the 
FCC hopes to spur investment in other competing broadband tech-
nologies.74  If a pay-to-play policy helps to encourage market entry by 
69  Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (policy statement).
70 Id.  
71 Press Release, supra note 30.  On June 8, 2006, the United States House of Rep-
resentatives passed the Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement 
(COPE) Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006), which has yet to be ap-
proved by the Senate.  The COPE Act would amend Title VII of the Communications 
Act of 1934 and give the FCC the authority to “adjudicate any complaint alleging a vio-
lation of the broadband policy statement and the principles incorporated therein . . . .”  
Id.  However, outside of the adjudication of complaints, the FCC would not have au-
thority to “adopt or implement rules or regulations regarding enforcement of the 
broadband policy statement and principles incorporated therein . . . .”  Id. 
72 See Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC, Answers to Reporters’ Questions at the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/ 
agencies/fcc/networkneutrality/20060208.asp (“[T]he Commission . . . has adopted 
some network neutrality rules that address . . . some [of the] principles . . . . [T]he is-
sue of whether or not the carriers can charge any of the content providers . . . has 
come up recently . . . . [T]he Commission is still trying to evaluate what that is . . . . I 
think that the marketplace is still evolving . . . .”). 
73 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14,987 (describing the “principle” that “consumers are enti-
tled to competition among network providers”). 
74 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,884 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report and order and no-
tice of proposed rulemaking) (describing the importance of “the threat of competition 
from other forms of broadband Internet access, whether satellite, fixed or mobile wire-
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increasing the possible rewards of competing in the broadband pro-
vider market, it is reasonable to assume that the FCC will likely decide 
not to intervene.75
Alternatively, Raymond Gifford, President and Senior Fellow of 
the Progress and Freedom Foundation, has suggested that the FTC 
should “supervise broadband services.”76  Gifford argues that, under 
“the state of the law right now,” the FTC has the power and is in a 
strong position to protect the nation’s broadband market and its con-
sumers.77
Gifford focuses on three factors that allow the FTC to balance the 
need for heightened “vigilance” in the broadband market against the 
need for “pricing freedom to recover fixed costs” in order to “encour-
age investment” in the broadband market.78  First, he emphasizes that 
the FTC is “dedicated to competition policy and consumer welfare.”79  
Thus, any FTC “intervention” would have to be based on “claims of 
real harm, not competitive disadvantage.”80  Second, Gifford reasons 
that, “as an agency of general jurisdiction, the FTC is less prone to” a 
specific industry’s influence.81  Since the FTC has regulatory authority 
across the entire U.S. economy, cable and DSL providers would find 
it more difficult to “‘capture’ the FTC’s regulatory agenda.”82  Third, 
he argues that the FTC would also be the appropriate broadband 
regulator because it is “largely an enforcement agency.” 83  It carries 
less, or a yet-to-be-realized alternative” to “stimulate further deployment of broadband 
infrastructure”). 
75 See Drew Clark, FCC Chief Opens Door to Tiered, High Speed Internet, TECH. DAILY, Jan. 
6, 2006, http://www.njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/tbFBRB1136842420157.html 
(quoting FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s prediction that the FCC will continue to try to 
“move from ‘legacy regulations,’” of monopolies to a market that emphasizes competi-
tion). 
76 Reconsidering Our Communications Laws:  Ensuring Competition and Innovation:  
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Raymond 
L. Gifford), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/060616gifford_com.pdf. 
77 Id.  The change in a broadband provider’s classification—from a common car-
rier to an information service—has significant effects on the FTC’s jurisdiction over 
broadband providers.  After the reclassification of broadband, “the statutory exclusion 
of common carriers from FTC jurisdiction is not applicable.”  Id.  The FTC currently 
“has jurisdiction within its competition policy and consumer protection mandates.”  Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  Gifford claims that the FTC will be “deferential to markets absent clear 
harm to consumer welfare.”  Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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out its mission by investigating and bringing actions for “specifically 
alleged and proven harms to consumer welfare.”84  This type of nar-
row “[a]fter-the-fact regulation” has considerable advantages over the 
potentially overbroad “before-the-fact rulemaking regulation” or legis-
lation.85
Currently, the FTC has formed an Internet Access Task Force in 
order to “develop . . . expertise in the area of Internet access.”86  Deb-
orah Platt Majoras, current Chairman of the FTC, has committed to 
coordinating with the FCC and recognizes that “the FCC’s mandate 
goes beyond competition and consumer protection.”87  As described 
above, the FCC, in an effort to encourage broadband deployment, has 
reduced regulatory constraints on broadband providers.  Thus, where 
the jurisdictions of the FCC and the FTC intersect, the FTC may likely 
defer to the “lighter-touch” policy employed by the FCC. 
B.  Legislation Adopting Neutrality Principles 
In the absence of a committed FCC policy toward neutrality, some 
members of Congress have sought to impose such a policy through 
legislation.  Since the spring of 2006, the NN debate has been publi-
cized on a national scale,88 with both telecommunications and  
e-commerce companies spending millions to influence Congress.89
Both houses of Congress have held hearings on NN and listened 
to the viewpoints of academics, scientists, engineers, businesspeople, 
and even an “Internet Evangelist.”90  In a hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Lawrence 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, The Federal Trade Commission in the 
Online World:  Promoting Competition and Protecting Consumers, Remarks at the 
Progress and Freedom Foundation’s Aspen Summit 12 (Aug. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060821ppfaspenfinal.pdf. 
87 Id. at 19-20. 
88 See Kim Hart & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Tech Faceoff:  Net Neutrality, in the Eye of the 
Beholder; Stark Contrasts in the Debate over the Future of the Internet, WASH. POST, July 2, 
2006, at F4 (describing the national debate over NN). 
89 See Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Republicans Defeat Net Neutrality Proposal, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Apr. 5, 2006, http://news.com.com/Republicans+defeat+Net+neutrality+proposal/ 
2100-1028_3-6058223.html (explaining that lobbying has grown around the NN de-
bate). 
90 See Net Neutrality:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transporta-
tion, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Vinton Cerf, “Vice 
President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.”). 
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Lessig proposed that Congress “ratify” former FCC Chairman Powell’s 
four “Internet Freedoms,”91 with an additional restriction upon pay-to-
play “access-tiering.”92  On June 28, 2006, though, the Senate Commit-
tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation rejected an NN 
amendment that would have disallowed pay-to-play systems based on 
network content.93  Under the defeated legislation, for example, Com-
cast would not have been able to charge Google Video for assured de-
livery of its time-sensitive packets.  On the other hand, the legislation 
would have given broadband providers the option to offer “consumer-
tiered” services.  Broadband providers would have been able to charge 
consumers based on either “bandwidth guarantees” or “service guar-
antees.”94  With the option to charge for different levels of broadband 
use, broadband providers would have retained their incentives to 
build better broadband services and increase their capacity, even if 
the proposed amendment had not been defeated. 
Those opposing the NN legislation proposed by members of Con-
gress and Lessig fear the “one size fits all” approach, emphasizing that 
in the absence of an actual danger, “prophylactic” legislation “may do 
more harm than good.”95  In a continuing period of growth in which 
even the most experienced businesses cannot accurately predict mar-
ket outcomes,96 critics like Christopher Yoo argue that there is “little 
91 See supra note 29. 
92 See Hearing, supra note 90, at 55 (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of 
Law, Stanford Law School). 
93 See Grant Gross, Senate Panel Rejects Net Neutrality in Tie Vote:  Stevens:  Supporters 
Should ‘Build Their Own Network’, COMPUTERWORLD, June 28, 2006, http:// 
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9001506 
(describing the amendment as “a proposal that would have required broadband pro-
viders to give their competitors the same speeds and quality of service as they give to 
themselves or their partners”); Kim Hart & Sara Kehaulani Goo, ‘Net Neutrality’ Amend-
ment Rejected; Senate Committee Approves Telecom Bill, but Republicans May Need More Votes, 
WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at D5 (reporting that a “proposal to prevent Internet ser-
vice providers from charging Web firms more for faster service to consumers” failed to 
obtain enough votes from the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Com-
mittee). 
94 Hearing, supra note 90, at 58 (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stan-
ford Law School), available at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/Lessig_Testimony.2.pdf.  
A “bandwidth guarantee” is an assurance of a minimum level of speed, while a “service 
guarantee” is an assurance that a certain service (such as video, voice, or gaming) 
would work properly on the network.  Id. 
95 Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1847, 1855, 1896 (2006). 
96 For example, industry giant AT&T failed to appreciate the potential of the 
Internet.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 32-33 (2001) (describing 
AT&T’s initial reaction to the Internet). 
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reason” to believe that a government-imposed outcome “will do any 
better.”97  Thus, legislative or agency involvement “meant to forestall a 
perceived danger that has not yet materialized” has a potential for be-
ing overbroad.98  Even though Congress’s purpose may be to protect 
innovation, passing legislation that cannot adapt to changing market 
environments may have the effect of inhibiting innovation.99
C.  Antitrust as a Framework for an Enforcement Mechanism 
Those opposing the Lessig-type legislation often prefer a “market 
power alternative” approach in which any intervention (1) is “narrowly 
targeted to specific instances of market power, in terms of both geo-
graphic scope and behavioral requirements of the remedy”; and (2) 
“incorporate[s] a rigorous competitive standard and evidentiary showing.”100  
The “market power alternative” approach sounds remarkably similar 
to antitrust enforcement of anticompetitive monopolistic activity.  By 
imposing penalties and restrictions on broadband providers’ specific 
anticompetitive conduct, a framework based on antitrust law would 
alleviate the need for congressional legislation prescribing specific re-
quirements for competition.101  Thus, an antitrust framework serves as 
a pragmatic middle ground to protect Internet innovation. 
The “overriding goal” of antitrust law “is to maintain public confi-
dence in the market mechanism by deterring and punishing instances 
of economic oppression.”102  In addition, a more targeted goal of anti-
97 Yoo, supra note 95, at 1897-98. 
98 Id. at 1898. 
99 See id. at 1898-99 (expressing doubts about the ability of government actors to 
foster innovation). 
100 Hearing, supra note 90, at 52 (testimony of Kyle D. Dixon, Federal Institute for 
Regulatory Law and Economics); see also Yoo, supra note 95, at 1896-1900 (preferring a 
targeted response against anticompetitive activity to broad prophylactic legislation). 
101 David Farber, Professor of Computer Science and Public Policy at Carnegie 
Mellon University, opposes NN legislation because he believes that sufficient mecha-
nisms exist in current antitrust law to protect Internet application companies.  Net Neu-
trality and the Future of the Web (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast July 24, 2006); see also Getting 
a Fix on Network Neutrality, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 14, 2006, at 4, available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlecfm?articleis=1497 (describing Wharton 
Professor of Business and Public Policy Gerald Faulhaber’s view that “companies are 
better off filing antitrust suits to handle concerns over net favoritism”). 
102 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN IN-
TEGRATED HANDBOOK 9-10 (2000).  “Antitrust preserves and protects markets as an 
alternative to more intrusive government regulation or control of the economy.”  Id. 
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trust is the promotion of innovation.103  Monopolists, such as broad-
band providers, have “a reduced incentive to innovate,” and, if they do 
innovate, they “may be motivated to suppress or delay commercializa-
tion.”104  One treatise acknowledges that, in order “to protect its mo-
nopoly, a firm may even attempt to suppress or discourage others 
from marketing available innovation”105—the danger identified by this 
Comment.  The application of antitrust law in the context of Internet 
applications would help protect future innovations like VoIP. 
The FCC’s focus on the deregulation of the provision of broad-
band is meant to spur competition between DSL, cable, and alterna-
tive providers in the deployment of broadband.106  Deregulation often 
expands the domain of antitrust.107  When the government moves 
103 Id. at 13.  Innovation includes “improving [a] product, producing it more effi-
ciently, or perhaps replacing it with an entirely different product that outperforms the 
old one.”  Id. 
104 Id.  For example, both cable and DSL providers were well aware of VoIP as a 
viable technology, although neither had sufficient incentive to commercialize the 
product.  See FERGUSON, supra note 39, at 4-5 (arguing that cable providers and “in-
cumbent local exchange carriers” have a shared interest in preventing “open-
architecture broadband competition”). 
105 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 13. 
106 To achieve the goal of increased competition, the FCC seeks to provide incen-
tives for developing technologies such as satellite, 3G, WiFi, and power line broadband 
to enter the broadband services market.  See supra note 74.  After the Brand X Court’s 
upholding of the FCC’s “information service” determination for cable, and the FCC’s 
subsequent reclassification of DSL as an information service, see supra notes 66-68 and 
accompanying text, major companies such as Google began to invest heavily in alterna-
tive provider technologies.  See Marguerite Reardon, Broadband’s Power-Line Push, CNET 
NEWS.COM, July 11, 2005, http://news.com.com/Broadbands+power-line+push/2100-
1034_3-5780316.html (describing Google’s post-Brand X investment in broadband 
power line technology).  Although increased competition looms in the future, the 
DSL/cable duopoly will likely remain steadfast.  See Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,884 
(F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (“Given 
recent trends, the market penetration of cable modem and DSL broadband Internet 
access services, in particular, could grow dramatically in the future.”). 
107 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 775 (discussing how the deregula-
tion of an industry may “enlarge the realm of antitrust”).  In Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004), the Supreme Court 
focused on “the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anti-
competitive harm” in deciding whether to apply the refusal-to-deal doctrine to an anti-
trust claim.  The Court recognized that “[w]here [a regulatory] structure exists, the 
additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be 
small.”  Id.  But “[w]here, by contrast, ‘[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory 
scheme which performs the antitrust function,’ the benefits of antitrust are worth its 
sometimes considerable disadvantages.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. 
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)). 
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from regulation toward the “competitive ideal,” antitrust law can be 
available if “conduct varies significantly from the competitive 
norm.”108  Some commentators who identify potential anticompetitive 
actions by broadband providers109 support a case-by-case approach, 
but are reluctant to support “a categorical requirement that all broad-
band [providers] make their networks available to all content and ap-
plications.”110
This Comment concludes that, although antitrust concepts poten-
tially could be applied effectively by the FCC111 or the FTC,112 the 
courts are currently the most effective forum for adjudicating anti-
competitive acts by broadband providers. Thus, in the current envi-
ronment, antitrust law should be the primary method to protect inno-
vation and ensure that the competitive ideal is achieved in the market 
for the provision of broadband services. 
IV.  A BROADBAND PAY-TO-PLAY POLICY WOULD  
VIOLATE ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
This Part focuses on the potential antitrust violations a pay-to-play 
system might encounter in an era of reduced FCC regulation of in-
formation services.  The proposed pay-to-play system would have se-
108 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 775. 
109 An anticompetitive action could be, for example, “a broadband provider 
bar[ring] access to an Internet application that competes directly with its core busi-
ness.”  Yoo, supra note 95, at 1899. 
110 Id. at 1899-1900 (arguing that “blanket” restrictions are the wrong approach to 
anticompetitive behavior by broadband providers); see also supra note 101 (describing 
David Farber’s belief that antitrust law is sufficient to protect Internet application 
competition). 
111 For a recommendation on how the FCC should regulate broadband, see AT-
KINSON & WEISER, supra note 46.  Atkinson and Weiser suggest a three-part solution to 
the regulation of broadband, largely focusing on congressional empowerment of the 
FCC to monitor broadband providers’ “access and usage policies” as well as to “over-
see[] the use of discriminatory access arrangements to make sure that any such ar-
rangements do not harm competition (and consumers).”  Id. at 2.  Atkinson and 
Weiser recommend that the FCC should respond to claims using an “expedited,” “ad-
judicative,” “antitrust-like” approach.  Id.  They reason that, “[u]nder such a model, a 
firm that suspected discrimination in favor of a competitor could commence a pro-
ceeding to challenge that practice and be assured of a timely response.”  Id. at 13.  Al-
though “the FCC [may] arguably possess the authority today (under its ancillary juris-
diction) to implement [Atkinson and Weiser’s] model of regulation,” the “antitrust-
like” approach is unlikely to be implemented without specific congressional confirma-
tion of such authority.  Id.; see also supra Part III.A (concluding that in the near future, 
the FCC is likely to take a hands-off approach to broadband regulation). 
112 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
  
2007] VOIP AND PAY-TO-PLAY 1325 
 
vere exclusionary effects that would threaten to destroy the estab-
lished competitive norm in Internet applications.  By unfairly increas-
ing rivals’ costs, broadband providers could be guilty of monopoliza-
tion, which would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.113
A.  The Monopolization Claim Against a Pay-To-Play System 
Under antitrust law, the offense of monopolization has two ele-
ments:  “(1) [T]he possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a su-
perior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”114
1.  Monopoly Power Test 
In a monopoly power analysis under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
the primary question concerns whether the defendant possesses “‘the 
power to control prices or exclude competition.’”115  Courts must first 
define the relevant product and geographic markets for each case 
presented.116  Since the pay-to-play system would use broadband pro-
viders’ duopoly117 power in fiberoptic networks to harm competitors 
113 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
114 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
115 Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 
377, 391 (1956)); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 86 (“The ultimate 
question concerning power is whether the defendant possesses power over price and 
the power to exclude competition.”). 
116 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 86-87 (describing how courts define 
the relevant product and geographical markets). 
117 Normally, monopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof 
of a single-firm monopoly.  Nonetheless, whether the conduct of duopolistic firms act-
ing in tacit collusion creates a monopoly remains an open question.  Compare Morgen-
stern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a “split in author-
ity” on the question of whether a monopolization claim may be proven by “combining 
the market power of multiple defendants”), and Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. 
Gen. Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 490 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to decide “whether a 
shared monopoly theory may be viable under some circumstances” because the instant 
case provided no risk of a shared monopoly), and Santana Prod., Inc. v. Sylvester & As-
soc., Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp’s suggestion that “Section 2 may be invoked against shared monopolies in 
which ‘no single firm possesses sufficient power to be considered a ‘monopolist’ but 
nevertheless a relatively few firms achieve monopoly-like’ results”), with Indiana Gro-
cery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1416 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s theory “at best . . . poses the danger that [the defendant’s] . . . anticom-
petitive conduct could result in diminished price competition in an oligopolistic, or at 
worst, duopolistic market.  Section 2, however, does not govern single-firm anticom-
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in the applications market, the relevant product market would be the 
provision of broadband services.  The geographic market for monop-
oly power is the region where the broadband companies provide ser-
vice to end users.  For example, Cox Communications operates in lim-
ited areas within the United States,118 so its “geographic market,” for 
the purpose of a monopoly analysis, would include only those regions 
where it does offer broadband service. 
Next, courts likely would look to the “cross-elasticity of demand” 
to determine the market power of broadband providers in the rele-
vant geographic markets.119  Presently, the provision of broadband ser-
vices is a duopoly; the only significant participants are DSL and cable 
providers.120  As of the end of 2005, DSL and cable providers held over 
90% of the broadband market.121  In addition, many consumers have 
little or no choice between broadband providers.  To illustrate, 91% 
of zip codes only have either one or zero cable providers to choose 
from.122  Thus, even those consumers who can choose between cable 
and DSL lack meaningful choice, which suggests a low cross-elasticity 
of demand. 
Those who argue against NN regulations often claim that compe-
tition between broadband providers will protect consumer prefer-
petitive conduct aimed only at creating an oligopoly.”), and H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 724, 741 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]n order to 
sustain a charge of monopolization or attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must al-
lege the necessary domination of a particular defendant.”), and ID Sec. Sys. Canada, 
Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 649 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[T]hose courts 
that have squarely addressed the issue have determined that § 2 of the Sherman Act 
applies to conduct of single firms only, rather than to the conduct of a small number 
of firms engaged in tacit collusion, as in cases involving oligopoly, shared monopoly, 
or . . . duopoly.”). 
118 See Cox Communications, Customer Support, http://www.cox.com/support/ 
?gothere=/techsupport.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (providing a map of Cox Com-
munications’ service areas). 
119 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 
(1992) (“The extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another market de-
pends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one prod-
uct in response to a price change in another, i.e., the ‘cross-elasticity of demand.’” 
(quoting E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 400)). 
120 Wireless broadband has grown as a competitor to DSL and cable in the last 
year.  However, the wireless technology cannot currently offer the same levels of speed 
and service that its fixed-line rivals now provide.  See supra note 106 and accompanying 
text (discussing the future market possibilities for alternative broadband providers). 
121 INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS:  
STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2005, at 3 (2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-266596A1.pdf. 
122 Id. at tbl.16. 
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ences and maintain innovation.  For example, they contend that if a 
DSL provider institutes a pay-to-play system, consumers can switch 
their Internet service to another broadband provider.123  Although 
this claim may prevail once the broadband services industry has 
achieved the competitive ideal with a variety of providers—such as 
DSL, cable, power line, satellite, WiFi, and 3G—offering broadband 
services, the U.S. broadband market is still far from this competitive 
ideal.   Alternative broadband networks hold less than 2% of the cur-
rent residential market.124  Thus, since about 58% of zip codes have 
zero or one asymmetric DSL provider,125 in most areas of the country 
the only other choice for a consumer may be a cable provider.  There-
fore, in today’s market, DSL and cable broadband service hold du-
opoly power.126
In addition to maintaining duopoly power, both DSL and cable 
providers have been signaling to one another their respective plans to 
institute a pay-to-play system.127  Due to the duopolistic nature of the 
market—high concentration, barriers to entry, diffused buyers, trans-
parent sales, largely homogeneous products, excess capacity, and con-
tracts terminable at will—the likelihood of parallelism is extremely 
high.128  Thus, due to a captive consumer base and complete control 
over fiberoptic networks, broadband providers have market power. 
123 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 95, at 1894 (“The presence of competition drastically 
reduces the ability of network owners to use exclusivity arrangements to harm competi-
tion because disgruntled consumers can simply transfer their subscriptions to another 
network.”). 
124 INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., supra note 121, at chart 6.  For the considerable 
future, there likely will be only two dominant, partially competitive types of broadband 
service.  Id. 
125 Id. at tbl.16. 
126 On its face, the FCC data shows an increase in the number of competing 
broadband providers and decreased market concentration.  See, e.g., id. at tbls.8 & 16.  
However, the FCC’s data and market analysis have been criticized for inaccurately over-
estimating consumer choice.  See S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II:  
THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S DIGITAL DECLINE 19 (2006) available at http:// 
www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf (generally criticizing the FCC’s broadband 
data collection and analysis); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS:  BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, 
BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 
(2006) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf (reassessing several of 
the FCC’s broadband conclusions regarding consumer choices). 
127 Broadband providers have been announcing their plans to institute a pay-to-
play system through the media.  See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
128 See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 526-28 
(5th ed. 2003) (stating the circumstances and factors surrounding a market with price 
coordination among oligopolists). 
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For the purposes of this Comment, I refer to cable and DSL pro-
viders in general terms.  Although distinct broadband providers exist 
for each type of technology, I believe there are reasons to safely make 
generalized references here.129  First, “the top two cable companies 
and the top two DSL companies together controlled over half of the 
U.S. broadband market.”130  Thus, there remains significant concen-
tration in the broadband market.  Second, the “U.S. broadband mar-
ket is essentially a series of regional duopolies.”131  According to a re-
cent study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “the 
median number of providers available to consumers [is] just two.”132  
Thus, the majority of broadband consumers have, at most, one choice:  
the choice between cable and DSL. 
2.  Conduct Test:  Refusal To Deal 
Unfair competition can seriously harm consumers, particularly 
when marked by “overly aggressive or predatory strategies.”133  “Com-
petition on the merits” is to be protected,134 but in the time-sensitive 
application market, a pay-to-play system would foreclose such compe-
tition.  A price buffer would separate broadband providers from inde-
pendent VoIP rivals, making it nearly impossible for these companies 
to compete based on quality of service, design of application, and 
other aspects.   
Although section 2 of the Sherman Act provides multiple avenues 
to pursue antitrust liability,135 a pay-to-play system would most signifi-
129 Of course, in order to make an actual determination of market power it is nec-
essary to compile detailed market data. 
130 Turner, supra note 126, at 19. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. (citing TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 126).  The GAO criticized the 
FCC’s most recent broadband data, in which the FCC concluded that “the median 
number of providers” was eight.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 126. 
133 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 105. 
134 Id. 
135 For example, Internet application companies also may have a claim under the 
“essential facilities doctrine.”  Although several U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
adopted this doctrine, the Supreme Court has neither rejected nor adopted it to date.  
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(2004) (“We have never recognized [the essential facilities] doctrine, and we find no 
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.” (citation omitted)).  In order 
to establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities doctrine, a party 
must prove four factors:  “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
(2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential 
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cantly violate the “conduct test” by breaching the limited duty of a 
monopolist to continue to deal with competitors. 
Generally, there is no absolute duty imposed upon a monopolist 
to deal or cooperate with competitors.136  However, a monopolist may 
have a duty to deal with rivals in some circumstances.137  A monopolist 
may violate its duty to deal, for instance, when it foregoes an estab-
lished complementary relationship with a rival for an exclusionary 
purpose.138  Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., and their progeny support the gen-
eral rule that “a firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if 
it excludes rivals from the monopolized market by restricting a com-
plementary or collaborative relationship without an adequate business 
justification.”139  Although courts and scholars have defined exclusion 
in a variety of ways, one helpful definition describes it as “a practice 
that ‘raises rival’s costs,’ either directly or indirectly through foreclos-
ing a rival from inexpensive access to customers.”140
facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the 
feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.” 
Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 443, 448 (2002) (quoting MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)).  Although its elements of proof are slightly different, 
the essential facilities doctrine is similar to the refusal-to-deal doctrine in a key way: 
“The defendant’s duty to deal in the essential facility cases appears to have about the 
same scope as the defendant’s duty to deal in the Aspen case, where the Court did not 
rely on the essential facility doctrine.”  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 307 (2d ed. 1999). 
136 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (discussing exceptions to the general “proposition that 
there is no duty to aid competitors”). 
137 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 114 (stating that “[a] monopolist’s 
duty to deal is likely to be found when such dealings enhance consumer welfare and 
when the refusal to deal raises rivals’ costs and has no efficiency or welfare-enhancing 
justification”). 
138 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 
(1992) (denying summary judgment to the defendant in an antitrust claim where the 
defendant attempted to prohibit servicing of its equipment by independent compa-
nies); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985) 
(holding that attempting to block a competing ski business from participating in a ma-
jor-ticket program violated the duty to deal); see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11. 
139 Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak 
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 496 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
140 Id. at 496 n.9.  In Aspen Skiing, “the Supreme Court defined exclusionary con-
duct as that which (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either 
does not further meritorious competition or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive 
way.”  Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 529 (E.D. 
Tex. 2004) (citing Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32); see also Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 
at 482-83 (“The second element of a § 2 claim is the use of monopoly power ‘to fore-
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The Aspen Skiing litigation developed when Aspen Skiing Com-
pany (Ski Co.) refused to continue dealing with its smaller rival, As-
pen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Highlands).141  For years prior to 
the litigation, Ski Co. and Highlands worked jointly to provide the 
“all-Aspen” ticket:  a six-day ski ticket that allowed skiers to access the 
four mountains in Aspen at a rate discounted from the individual 
mountain rate.142  The two companies distributed revenues based on a 
randomized survey that determined “how many skiers with the [four]-
area ticket used each mountain.”143  Although Ski Co. attempted to 
sell a competitive six-day ski ticket confined to its three mountains, 
the collaborative four-area ticket outsold it “nearly two to one.”144  
Thus, as Jonathan Baker put it, even though the two mountains com-
peted, “Highland’s product was a demand complement to Ski Co.’s 
product in producing the all-Aspen ski ticket.”145
In 1978, Ski Co. threatened to discontinue the all-Aspen ticket 
unless Highlands accepted a percentage of revenues “considerably be-
low Highland’s historical average based on usage.”146  When High-
lands refused, Ski Co. offered a “three-area, six-day ticket featuring 
only its mountains.”147  Without participating in the all-Aspen ticket, 
“Highlands basically bec[ame] a day ski area in a destination re-
sort.”148  Thus, by being excluded from the all-Aspen ticket market, 
close competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’” (quot-
ing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (citations omitted))); Thomas 
G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 
241, 249 (1987) (discussing how a monopoly can either restrain output below competi-
tive levels, raise its price above competitive levels, or increase rivals’ costs). 
141 Ski Co. owned and operated three of Aspen’s four mountains, while Highlands 
owned and operated the fourth mountain.  See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589. 
142 Id. at 589-91. 
143 Id. at 590.  “Highlands’ share of the revenues from the 4-area, 6-day ticket was 
17.5% in 1973-1974, 18.5% in 1974-1975, 16.8% in 1975-1976, and 13.2% in 1976-
1977.”  Id. 
144 Id. at 592. 
145 Baker, supra note 139, at 498. 
146 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 592.  “[A] member of Ski Co.’s board of directors can-
didly informed a Highlands official that he had advocated making Highlands ‘an offer 
that [it] could not accept.’”  Id. 
147 Id. at 593. 
148 Id. at 594 (quotation marks omitted).  Most of the skiers in Aspen traveled long 
distances and stayed in the area for a week or more.  Aspen patrons were largely unin-
terested in a day ski area and enjoyed the flexibility of being able to ski multiple moun-
tains on one ticket.  See Baker, supra note 139, at 498 (“Without participating in a con-
venient all-Aspen ticket, Highlands effectively became a day ski area in a destination 
market, and was placed at a disadvantage in attracting the patronage of the many skiers 
who came to Aspen from far away and stayed for a week.”). 
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Highlands was placed at a significant competitive disadvantage and its 
“share of the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen declined 
steadily.”149
The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in the record 
was adequate to support a finding that Ski Co.’s behavior was unlaw-
fully exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act.150  The Court 
focused on Ski Co.’s abandonment of the profitable course of dealing, 
stressing that “the monopolist elected to make an important change 
in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive mar-
ket and had persisted for several years.”151  Important in the Court’s 
determination was the fact that Ski Co. “fail[ed] to offer any efficiency 
justification . . . for its pattern of conduct.”152  The Court concluded 
that “the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its cus-
tomers from doing business with its smaller rival.”153
Although Aspen Skiing has been the subject of scholarly criticism 
over the years,154 and was deemed by Justice Scalia to be “at or near 
the outer boundary of § 2 liability,”155 the Supreme Court nevertheless 
unanimously reaffirmed that its Aspen Skiing holding regarding refus-
als to deal remains good law in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.156
149 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 594.  After the four-day ticket was abolished in 1977, 
Highlands revenues went “from 20.5% in 1976-1977, to 15.7% in 1977-1978, to 13.1% 
in 1978-1979, to 12.5% in 1979-1980, to 11% in 1980-1981.”  Id. 
150 Id. at 610-11. 
151 Id. at 603. 
152 Id. at 608. 
153 Id. at 610.  The Court also noted “that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency 
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill 
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”  Id. at 610-11. 
154 For example, Professor Hovenkamp states that “[t]he difficult question for 
those supporting Aspen is finding a way of applying its principle, without losing control 
of it.”  HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, at 295. 
155  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
409 (2004). 
156 Id.; see also Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 
536 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (“The bottom line is that criticism notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that Aspen Skiing’s holding about unilateral refusals to deal is good 
law.”).  In Trinko, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s refusal-to-deal 
claims did “not fit within the limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing.”  Trinko, 
540 U.S. at 409.  The Court distinguished the Trinko defendant’s actions as statutorily 
compelled.  Id.  Thus, without a voluntary course of conduct to use as a baseline 
against which to compare the defendant’s present actions, “anticompetitive malice” 
could not be distinguished from “competitive zeal.”  Id.; see also Data Gen. Corp. v. 
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply the 
Aspen Skiing framework because the court was “unable to view [the defendant’s] mar-
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In Trinko, the Supreme Court re-emphasized two of the three dis-
tinctive features of Aspen Skiing that made the imposition of liability 
appropriate.  First, Ski Co.’s “unilateral termination of a voluntary 
(and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a will-
ingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive 
end.” 157  In addition, Ski Co.’s “unwillingness to renew the ticket even 
if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive 
bent.”158
Similar to Aspen Skiing, “the Kodak case emerged out of a change 
in a firm’s business policies that harmed rivals by exploiting a rela-
tionship involving product complements.”159  Kodak manufactured 
and sold “high-volume photocopiers and micrographic equipment.”160  
In addition, it also separately sold repair services and replacement 
parts for its machines directly to its customers.161  For half a decade, 
Kodak also sold replacement parts to independent service organiza-
tions (ISOs), which would independently provide repair services to 
customers, often at a discounted rate.162  Thus, ISOs were Kodak’s ri-
vals when servicing Kodak’s equipment, but they were also Kodak’s 
parts distributors.163  The litigation began after Kodak began selling 
replacement parts only to customers who either used Kodak’s repair 
services or repaired their own machines, rather than hiring ISOs.164  
Through this policy, Kodak aimed to “make it more difficult for ISOs 
ket practices in both competitive and noncompetitive conditions”); Levine v. BellSouth 
Corp., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (distinguishing Levine from Aspen 
Skiing because the court could find “no prior conduct that sheds light upon Defen-
dant’s motivation in not providing . . . service”).  Additionally, the Trinko Court found 
“the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive 
harm” to be of “particular importance” in its decision not to apply the Aspen Skiing 
doctrine.  Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412. 
157 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (emphasis omitted). 
158 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
159 Baker, supra note 139, at 499. 
160 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456-57 (1992). 
161 Id. at 457.  “Kodak [did] not sell a complete system of original equipment, life-
time service, and lifetime parts for a single price.”  Id. 
162 Id.  In addition, “[s]ome ISO customers purchase[d] their own parts and 
hire[d] ISO’s only for service.”  Id. at 458.  Thus, customers either repaired the ma-
chines themselves, hired Kodak to perform service on their machine, or hired an ISO 
to do so.  Id. at 457-58. 
163 Baker, supra note 139, at 499. 
164 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458 (detailing Kodak’s policy of limiting ISOs’ ac-
cess to Kodak-produced parts). 
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to sell service for Kodak machines.”165  Most of the ISOs “lost substan-
tial revenue” or were driven out of business.166
Although the Supreme Court largely focused on Kodak’s tying 
sales of service to sales of parts, the Court also determined that the 
ISOs had presented evidence from which a court could find “that Ko-
dak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used 
its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak 
service market.”167  Thus, liability turned on “whether ‘valid business 
reasons’ [could] explain Kodak’s actions.”168  The Court concluded 
that “[n]one of Kodak’s asserted business justifications” were suffi-
cient to grant Kodak summary judgment.169
As Professor Baker explains, the legal analyses of the conduct re-
quirement in the Aspen Skiing and Kodak refusal-to-deal decisions have 
three key features in common.  First, in both cases, “the Court found 
that a rival (or rivals) was substantially excluded from that market by 
defendant’s conduct, in the sense that the rival was weakened signifi-
cantly (by a reduction in demand or increase in costs) or forced to 
exit.”170  Second, the Court in both cases “found that the monopolist 
excluded its rival or rivals from the market where the two competed 
by exploiting another relationship between the two, either a collabo-
rative or complementary one.”171  In both Aspen Skiing and Kodak, the 
collaborative vertical relationship between the firms created an op-
portunity for the monopolist to exclude the plaintiff from the com-
petitive horizontal market.172  Third, instead of directly considering 
the effect on competition, the Court inferred harm to competition 
“from the absence of a valid and sufficient business justification.”173
165 Id. at 458.  Kodak achieved its goal by limiting ISO access to all sources of Ko-
dak parts.  Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 483. 
168 Id.  Kodak contended that it had three valid business justifications:  “(1) to 
promote interbrand equipment competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of 
its service; (2) to improve asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and 
(3) to prevent ISOs from free riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts 
and service.”  Id. 
169 Id. at 485-86. 
170 Baker, supra note 139, at 501. 
171 Id.  “[A] change in prior conduct was a feature of both cases.”  Id. at 502. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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A pay-to-play system shares these three features and would have 
exclusionary effects on Internet application companies, like Vonage, 
that directly compete with broadband providers’ applications. 
First, once a pay-to-play system is implemented, Internet applica-
tion companies that rely on time-sensitive delivery will be effectively 
excluded from the market.  Using the VoIP example, if the applica-
tion company does not pay the required fee for priority delivery, there 
is a strong likelihood that its VoIP service will not work properly dur-
ing periods of high congestion.  The broadband provider, however, 
will always provide priority status to its own revenue-generating VoIP 
product, ensuring proper delivery of voice packets.174  On the other 
hand, if a VoIP application company did agree to pay a priority deliv-
ery fee to help guarantee the proper functioning of its service, broad-
band providers would have successfully put that company at an eco-
nomic disadvantage by artificially raising its costs of doing business.175  
Under either scenario, VoIP application companies like Vonage 
would be “excluded”176 from the VoIP market. 
Second, this exclusion from the market will become possible only 
because, with a pay-to-play system, broadband providers will be ex-
ploiting a vertical relationship that was previously complementary.  
Prior to the implementation of the pay-to-play system, broadband pro-
viders and Internet application companies shared a mutually benefi-
cial relationship.  The value of a broadband provider’s service ulti-
mately depends on which applications and content it supports.177  
Simply put, the more applications and content that are made accessi-
174 This conduct is analogous to the harm created in Kodak.  Because Kodak pre-
vented access to its repair parts, the ISOs were unable to effectively perform their ser-
vice.  Assured a supply of parts, Kodak was the only one able to continue to provide 
repair services.  Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458. 
175 This scenario is similar to Aspen Skiing, in which Ski Co. threatened to cut off 
the all-Aspen pass unless Highlands accepted reduced compensation.  Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 592 (1985).  Ski Co.’s action was 
essentially a pay-to-play policy.  After Highlands refused and Ski Co. terminated its par-
ticipation in the all-Aspen pass, Highlands attempted to create a multiple-mountain 
pass by purchasing lift tickets to Ski Co.’s mountains at retail.  Id. at 593-94.  Thus, as a 
result of the exclusionary tactics, Highlands was forced to sell its multiple-mountain 
pass at a much higher price than the Ski Co. multiple-mountain pass, or else risk more 
significant losses.  Id. 
176 See Baker, supra note 139, at 496 n.9 (defining exclusion as forcing a rival to 
exit the market or weakening the rival “significantly” by increasing its costs or reducing 
demand for its services). 
177 See Wu, supra note 4, at 85 (describing the appeal of broadband as linked to its 
ability to accept a variety of content). 
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ble, the more a consumer is willing to pay for her broadband connec-
tion.  As a result, broadband providers owe most of their financial suc-
cess to the development of applications and content.178  Thus, to date, 
most broadband providers have maintained large “downstream” ac-
cess in order to attract customers to their services.179
Many commentators argue that, despite the current pay-to-play 
musings, broadband providers have an incentive to maintain open 
platforms in order to bring the highest value to the end user.  As evi-
dence, they point to the failure of Internet providers that did not pre-
serve application open access (specifically, Prodigy and Compu-
Serv).180  These commentators believe that vertical integration often 
leads to important efficiencies and is not dangerous to competition.181  
Their argument suggests that, to a “platform monopolist” like a broad-
band provider, 
the applications are its inputs, and the monopolist has the same interest 
as any other party in minimizing its input costs.  Hence, if allowing open 
application development saves the monopolist money, then it will do 
so. . . . This analysis leads to a presumption that, in the telecommunica-
tions market, vertically integrated companies, even with monopoly 
power, should generally be left unregulated, absent special conditions, 
or exceptions.182
The pay-to-play situation, though, embodies one of these excep-
tions:  a company may take anticompetitive actions against applica-
tions that ride on its networks when that company’s “revenue stream 
178 It is also important to note that the development of applications and the suc-
cess of businesses such as Vonage or Napster would not have been possible without 
high speed fiberoptic networks. 
179 See Wu, supra note 16, at 162-63 (describing broadband providers’ present re-
strictions on network use).  For a comprehensive discussion of network restrictions see 
id. at 156-65. 
180 See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1888 (“The failure of early proprietary services pro-
vided by America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy attests to the market’s ability to 
discipline network owners who attempt to impose closed architectures on consumers 
who prefer open ones.”).  CompuServ and Prodigy maintained “self-contained ‘walled 
garden’ networks,” in which subscribers’ connections were limited to other members 
and centralized content.  Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1974, 1991 (2006).  Their networks were “slow to evolve because potential audiences of 
developers were slowed or shut out by centralized control over the network’s services.”  
Id. 
181 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-105 (2003) (describing the concept of “internalizing com-
plementary efficiencies”). 
182 Wu, supra note 4, at 86. 
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[may] be endangered by allowing unmitigated competition among 
unaffiliated applications.”183  For example, Madison River Communi-
cations blocked Vonage’s VoIP service on its broadband network.184  
In balancing the value of its traditional public switched telephone ser-
vice against the value of its broadband service, Madison River chose to 
degrade its broadband network in order to protect its “voice-based 
revenues.”185  Similarly, as Internet-based video services grow in popu-
larity and availability, “it is quite possible that cable providers . . . may 
face similar incentives” to block or degrade rival applications offering 
video over the Internet.186  Thus, although there is economic theory 
suggesting that broadband providers will not exploit their comple-
mentary relationships with Internet application companies, actual ex-
perience demonstrates that broadband providers have incentives to 
protect their core businesses at the expense of the Internet applica-
tion companies. 
Internet application companies, relying upon the mutually bene-
ficial relationship with broadband providers, have spent capital devel-
oping innovative applications, many of which require time-sensitive 
delivery.187  Broadband providers have recognized the cost advantages 
of a VoIP telephony system and have entered the market as horizontal 
competitors.  However, instead of competing on the merits, they seek 
to monopolize the VoIP market by exploiting their position of con-
trolling the last mile to the end user.  By raising the cost of competing 
for rival VoIP providers, broadband providers are exploiting access to 
consumers that they never would have had were it not for open-access 
networks and innovations created by Internet application companies. 
Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, 
Inc. provides a similar factual situation, in which the owner of a radio 
station exploited a complementary relationship with local concert pro-
moters in order to gain a monopoly in the concert promotion mar-
ket.188  The plaintiff, Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. (NIPP), pro-
183 ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 46, at 8-9. 
184 Id. at 9. 
185 See id. (“[Madison River’s] interest in protecting its voice-based revenues over-
rode its interest in providing a more valuable broadband service.”). 
186 Id. 
187 Similarly, in Kodak, the ISOs invested in training for their employees and in the 
development of the copier-service market based upon their reliance on the availability 
of parts from Kodak.  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
485 (1992). 
188 311 F. Supp. 2d. 1048, 1061 (D. Colo. 2004). 
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moted concerts in the Denver, Colorado, area.189  The defendant, 
Clear Channel Communications, was “one of the largest radio and en-
tertainment conglomerates in the world.”190  Clear Channel owned 
and operated eight radio stations in Denver.191 It also owned 
SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment (SFX), a national concert promo-
tions division, and Clear Channel Radio Festivals (Festivals), a radio 
concert promotions division.192
Both nationally and in the Denver market, radio stations and con-
cert promoters share a complementary relationship.193  As the NIPP 
Court explained, “[b]y advertising [a] concert, the radio generates 
more interest in the artist, which encourages listeners to listen to the 
radio to hear about the artist’s concert and to hear the artist’s 
songs.”194  It is customary, therefore, for radio stations to  
“promote” concerts for free, above and beyond the advertising time pur-
chased by the concert promoter, by mentioning the concert on-air, hold-
ing ticket giveaways, and conducting interviews with artists.  Such free 
promotion greatly benefits the concert promoter as well as the station by 
generating publicity and demand for the concert.
195
However, when Clear Channel entered the concert promotion 
business, its radio stations immediately stopped providing free promo-
tional support and advertising to any rival concert promoters.196  NIPP 
alleged that, as soon as Clear Channel became a horizontal competi-
tor, Clear Channel gave “preferential treatment to its [own] concert 
promotion business.”197  Although no rival promoters were allowed to 
have contact with Clear Channel’s radio program, music, or promo-
tions directors, SFX was “free to continue to have direct conversations 
with [Clear Channel radio stations] concerning concert promotion in 
the Denver market.”198
189 Id. at 1055. 
190 Id. at 1056. 
191 Id.  Eight was the maximum number of radio stations that one media company 
was allowed to own in the Denver area under the FCC rules.  Id. 
192 SFX was the “largest concert producer and entertainment promoter in the na-
tion.”  Id. 
193 Although “radio stations derive most of their income from advertisers who pay 
for advertising spots,” they also receive significant benefits from assisting concert pro-
moters on air.  Id. at 1060. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1060-61 (citation omitted). 
196 Id. at 1063-64.   
197 Id. at 1064. 
198 Id. 
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Citing Aspen Skiing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colo-
rado concluded that Clear Channel’s refusal to provide free promo-
tional support “is . . . in the worst interest of Clear Channel radio sta-
tions, which demonstrates an intent to monopolize.”199  Thus, the 
court held that Clear Channel’s refusal to deal “compels a trial on the 
issue of anticompetitive conduct in this case.”200
Similar to broadband providers’ artificial increase of competing 
Internet application companies’ costs through the pay-to-play system, 
the Clear Channel radio stations increased the costs of all other rival 
concert promoters by withholding previously complimentary on-air 
concert promotion.  In addition, just as applications help to drive the 
value of broadband service, a portion of the financial success of the 
Clear Channel radio stations could be attributed to the complemen-
tary relationship with the independent concert promoters.  Thus, 
Clear Channel exploited the previously complementary relationship 
with concert promoters in order to monopolize the concert promo-
tions market. 
Third, and finally, in both Aspen Skiing and Kodak, the Court in-
ferred harm to competition from the lack of business justification for 
the conduct.201  In analyzing conduct under a rule-of-reason standard, 
violative “exclusionary strategies . . . must be distinguished from bene-
ficial or benign competitive methods that will be tolerated even from 
a monopolist.”202  Thus, a broadband provider must offer a “procom-
petitive justification” for its conduct.203  The plaintiff may establish li-
ability if it can rebut the justification or “demonstrate that the anti-
competitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive 
benefit.”204  This is where the ultimate battleground lies for determin-
ing liability. 
199 Id. at 1106-07.  Important to the district court’s conclusion was that Clear 
Channel seemed to act against its own “commercial best interest” by refusing to pro-
vide advertising and promotional support to promoters.  Id. at 1107 (“Assuming that 
the refusal to deal is not in the best commercial interests of the radio stations, an in-
ference could be made that the refusal supports other, more sinister motives, such as 
the creation of a monopoly.”).  NIPP was also able to demonstrate “an increase in con-
cert ticket prices and a decreasing market share for all of Clear Channel’s competitors 
in the rock concert market” following Clear Channel’s refusal to deal.  Id. 
200 Id. at 1108. 
201 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
202 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 105. 
203 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (defining 
a “procompetitive justification” as “a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a 
form of competition on the merits”). 
204 Id. 
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The procompetitive justifications that broadband providers are 
likely to offer in defense of an antritrust claim are (1) the prevention 
of free riding upon their capital investments,205 (2) the need to ensure 
quality service,206 and (3) a lack of economic incentive to engage in 
such exclusionary activities. 
First and foremost, broadband providers assert that Internet ap-
plication companies are free riding on their “pipes.”207  This conten-
tion is similar to an argument presented in Kodak.  Kodak attempted 
to justify its exclusionary conduct as “prevent[ing] ISOs from free-
riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts and ser-
vice.”208  Both sides admitted that the ISOs “invest[ed] substantially in 
the service market, with training of repair workers and investment in 
parts inventory.”209  Kodak asserted that “the ISO’s [were] free-riding 
because they . . . failed to enter the equipment and parts markets.”210  
The Court rejected this justification outright,  explaining that “[t]his 
understanding of free-riding has no support in our case law.”211  The 
Court noted that it would be unreasonable and contrary to the anti-
trust laws to require a competitor “to enter two markets simultane-
ously” in order to compete.212
Similar to the ISOs in Kodak, Internet application companies have 
made considerable investments in developing their applications.  
Broadband providers cannot claim, as required under Kodak, that the 
application companies are free riding on their investments in compet-
205 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing broadband providers’ 
promotion of the free rider argument). 
206 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (specifying quality service and ef-
ficiency as benefits of smart pipes). 
207 AT&T Chairman Edward E. Whitacre Jr. recently argued:  “‘They don’t have 
any fiber out there.  They don’t have any wires. . . . They use my lines for free—and 
that’s bull.  For a Google or a Yahoo or a Vonage or anybody to expect to use these 
pipes for free is nuts!’”  Christopher Stern, The Coming Tug of War over the Internet, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2006, at B1. 
208 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992). 
209 Id. at 485. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  The Supreme Court distinguished Kodak’s asserted free-rider justification 
from both Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), where “the Court accepted free-
riding as a justification because without restrictions a manufacturer would not be able 
to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital 
and labor necessary to distribute the product.”  Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 485 n.33. 
212 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 485 (“[O]ne of the evils proscribed by the antitrust 
laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to en-
ter two markets simultaneously.”). 
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ing applications.  Instead, they implicitly resort to the argument re-
jected by the Kodak Court:  that in order to avoid free riding, the ap-
plication companies must enter both the application and broadband 
markets.213  Thus, using the pay-to-play system to prevent free riding is 
not a legitimate business justification under antitrust law. 
As an alternative justification, the broadband providers assert that 
a pay-to-play system is a fair and reasonable method of ensuring qual-
ity service to the end user.  They argue that, due to increased conges-
tion of the networks, it is necessary to build high bandwidth fiberoptic 
networks optimized for time-sensitive applications, such as voice, mu-
sic, or video delivery.214  In order to maintain the high quality of ser-
vice to end users on the optimized lines, they claim that they must use 
“smart pipe” technology to assign different levels of priority to differ-
ent applications.215  Thus, the argument goes, the pay-to-play system 
takes advantage of this new market created for priority delivery and is 
in no way meant to affect the applications that compete with broad-
band providers’ core revenue-generating services (generally, phone or 
video services). 
However, similar to the situation in Aspen Skiing, the broadband 
providers are foregoing short-term gains for long-term monopoly 
power.  In Aspen Skiing, the Court pointed out that Ski Co. placed its 
sunk investment at risk by refusing to continue past welfare-enhancing 
cooperation.216  Similarly, in the context of VoIP, broadband providers 
that are implementing a pay-to-play system are degrading the value of 
their networks by reducing the number of applications effectively 
reaching the end consumer and by significantly increasing their trans-
213 See Stern, supra note 207, at B1.  AT&T Chairman Whitacre emphasizes the fact 
that Internet application companies “don’t have any wires.”  Id.  Thus, he suggests that 
such companies must build their own networks in order to avoid free riding upon his 
company’s pipes. 
214 See Yoo, supra note 17, at 35-36 (explaining that increased consumer demand 
causes the need the upgrade the networks). 
215 See id. at 36 (discussing broadband providers’ consideration of “policy-based 
routers” to prioritize applications). 
216 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985) 
(“[T]he evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency 
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill 
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”); see also Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) 
(“The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of 
dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompeti-
tive end.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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action costs of monitoring their networks.217  Even if broadband pro-
viders recoup some of these losses through the pay-to-play system,218 
the extremely high cost of implementing such a system implicates an-
other incentive for doing so—long-term monopoly power.219  This is 
strong evidence that the broadband providers’ quality service justifica-
tions are pretextual. 
Even if a court concludes that the quality-service argument is 
strong and creates a legitimate business justification, a plaintiff still 
may establish liability by showing that the anticompetitive harm out-
weighs the procompetitive benefit.220  In the VoIP context, the poten-
tial for anticompetitive harm is significant.  The pay-to-play system in-
creases rival costs considerably, thus effectively excluding them from 
the market. 
Finally, commentators like Christopher Yoo, who support the 
freedom for broadband companies to experiment with different pric-
217 See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1875 (describing the significant transaction costs as-
sociated with metering Internet usage).  Yoo suggests that usage-sensitive pricing 
would be uneconomical and possibly more substantial than metering costs for the 
telephone industry, in which “the costs of metering and billing represent more than 
50% of the costs associated with an incremental call.”  Id. at 1868, 1875.  Internet pro-
tocols break “every piece of communication into smaller packets that are transmitted 
individually and reassembled at their destination.”  Id. at 1875.  Since “each packet is 
allowed to move independently . . . it is possible that different packets from the same 
communications to pass through different routes on their way to their destination.”  Id.  
Thus, “the number of records needed to account for the packets associated with a ten-
minute telephone call over the Internet could number in the tens of thousands.”  Id.  
As a result, “the industry has struggled to develop workable methods for metering 
Internet usage.”  Id. 
218 Broadband providers may also argue that the pay-to-play system, unlike Ski 
Co.’s three-mountain pass, was designed to increase both short-term and long-term 
profits.  However, in Delaware & Hudson Railway Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 
174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit rejected the alleged monopolist’s claim 
that the maximization of profits provided a sufficient legitimate business justification 
for its refusal to deal with a competitor.  The court held that “[a] monopolist cannot 
escape liability for conduct that is otherwise actionable simply because that conduct 
also provides short-term profits.”  Id. 
219 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (emphasizing the significance of Ski Co.’s willingness 
in Aspen Skiing “to forsake short-term profits to achieve a long-run anticompetitive 
end”). 
220 Since the broadband providers may be able to present a legitimate business jus-
tification, a court likely would engage in a rule-of-reason balancing of procompetitive 
benefits versus anticompetitive effects of such conduct.  See United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining the rule-of-reason analysis). 
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ing strategies,221 often cite the Chicago School of Economics’ “one 
monopoly rent” theory (also referred to as the “one monopoly profit” 
theory) in justifying the broadband companies’ vertical integration 
into the application market for VoIP.222  They argue that, under either 
the one monopoly rent theory or its broader version, called “ICE,” the 
companies will “internalize complementary efficiencies arising from 
[Internet] applications created by others.”223  As a result, the argu-
ment goes, the broadband companies have no economic incentive to 
exclude their competitors from the market. 
Although this theory is largely accepted by academics, there are 
two major exceptions to the general rule.  First, efficient competition 
in the applications market can be problematic to achieve if one of the 
competitors controls the platform.  During the early stages of deploy-
ment, a platform provider, such as a broadband company, has “incen-
tives to organize service innovation efficiently.”224  But, Jospeh Farrell 
explains, this incentive loses its force as the platform provider be-
comes able to collect “quasi-rents,” thereby gaining the incentive to 
“sabotage” innovations.225  The pay-to-play system that broadband pro-
viders plan to institute signals exactly this type of sabotage to inde-
pendent VoIP companies. 
Second, if the one monopoly rent theory were controlling, a DSL 
provider would be pleased to grant VoIP applications free access to its 
network because the applications would make the network more valu-
able to users and, therefore, more profitable for the DSL provider.226  
221 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005) 
(advocating a market-based solution that would encourage “network diversity” in the 
provision of broadband). 
222 See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1888 (arguing that the “one monopoly rent theorem” 
holds in the context of broadband). 
223 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 97-105.  Farrell and Weiser have reformu-
lated the theory—under the name “one monopoly profit” theory—into a broader 
claim that they call “internalizing complementary efficiencies” or “ICE.”  Id.  They ex-
plain that the “‘one monopoly profit’ label captures only part of ICE.”  Id. at 104.  Both 
ICE and the “one monopoly profit” theory “claim[] that a platform monopolist cannot 
gain by inefficiently leveraging its market power into applications.”  Id.  “But ICE goes 
further, stressing the broader principle that the platform monopolist gains from an 
efficient applications market . . . .”  Id.  For the purposes of this discussion, the theories 
are coterminous. 
224 Joseph Farrell, Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network (Competition 
Policy Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper No. CPC03-037, 2003), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC03-037. 
225 Id. 
226 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 109 (“[C]onsider the attitude of cable 
providers toward streaming video applications over their cable modems.  ICE would 
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However, as Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser explain, “a cable pro-
vider who allows video streaming will find it harder to engage in the 
profitable and customary price discrimination that sets high markups 
for premium cable programming,” and thus, “might rationally, but in-
efficiently, try to stop this innovative method of distribution.” 227  Simi-
larly, a DSL provider that allows VoIP calls on its network will find it 
much more difficult to price discriminate and profit from its tradi-
tional public switched telephone services.  Thus, rather than allowing 
Internet application companies to offer VoIP to its customers, a DSL 
provider might instead focus on stifling VoIP’s development and pro-
liferation. 
B.  Effect on the Market:  What if Application Companies Win? 
Under the Aspen and Kodak frameworks, broadband providers may 
be held accountable for establishing a pay-to-play system for compa-
nies with which they directly compete in the application market.  In 
the case of VoIP, even if application companies greatly increase their 
subscriber numbers, the applications will not have an appreciable ef-
fect on broadband traffic.  Just over the horizon, however, looms the 
potential for HD-quality video.  What will happen if application com-
panies, shielded by this precedent, begin to use larger and larger 
amounts of bandwidth? 
According to Gary R. Bachula, Vice President of Internet2, this 
question has already been answered in practice in the form of Inter-
net2.  Internet2 is a not-for-profit partnership whose “mission is to ad-
vance the state of the Internet . . . by operating for [its] members a 
very advanced, private, ultra-high-speed research and education net-
work called Abilene.”228  Abilene allows users to “‘live in the future’ of 
advanced broadband.”229
suggest that cable providers should happily endorse this use of their platform, as it 
would make the platform more valuable to users and therefore more profitable.”). 
227 Id. 
228 Hearing, supra note 90, at 65 (testimony of Gary R. Bachula).  Abilene provides 
“very high speed pipes [that are] 10,000 times faster than home broadband,” in order 
to enable its members to innovate by “try[ing] new uses of the network, develop[ing] 
new applications, [and] experiment[ing] with new forms of communications.”  Id. 
229 Id.  Users are able to take classes with teachers across the globe via “DVD-
quality video conferencing technology,” and “[r]ecently, students at Wichita State were 
able to play and take lessons from the New World Symphony in Miami using Inter-
net2’s network.”  Id. 
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While designing this network, Internet2 engineers assumed that a 
“smart pipe” that prioritized certain “bits” over others would be neces-
sary to assure prompt delivery of time-sensitive packets.230  For years, 
engineers thus attempted to ensure quality of service by inserting in-
telligence into the network; however, as the network developed, “re-
search and practical experience supported the conclusion that it was 
far more cost effective to simply provide more bandwidth.” 231  The re-
searchers found that a sufficient increase in bandwidth alleviated con-
gestion and removed the need to provide “preferential treatment” for 
time-sensitive packets.232
Experience has shown that the costs of improving the bandwidth 
of a network are not too steep: 
For example, a university campus in the Midwest that serves 14,000 stu-
dents and faculty recently estimated it would cost about [$50 a year per 
user] . . . [t]o upgrade to 1000 Mbps . . . . University campuses are like 
small towns or suburban neighborhoods.  Once [broadband providers] 
make their initial fiber investment, the relative cost of upgrading band-
width to customers is small.
233
The antitrust framework outlined in this Comment would not 
prevent broadband providers from charging consumers for different 
levels of access to bandwidth.  Thus, broadband providers would have 
ample incentives to upgrade their networks’ bandwidth capacities. 
C.  Use of “Judicial” Antitrust 
The use of antitrust principles to remedy anticompetitive harms in 
the broadband and Internet application markets is a pragmatic ap-
proach that avoids the necessity of overly broad government legisla-
tion, while preserving innovation and competition on the merits. 
1.  Antitrust in the New Economy 
Although “[a]ntitrust law is often characterized as an alternative 
to regulation,” some argue that antitrust courts should generally re-
frain from intervening in “new economy” monopolization cases.234  In 
230 Id. at 2. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (“All of the bits arrive fast enough, even if intermingled.”). 
233 Id. at 4. 
234 Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era, 
50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 550 (2005) (providing now-Justice Breyer’s description that 
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support of this position, commentators often point to the Schumpete-
rian critique and the risk of false positives.235
First, under the Schumpeterian view, market success entices rival 
companies to enter the market and develop “new technologies that 
will ultimately unseat the incumbent.”236  As a result, “any market 
power enjoyed by a dominant firm will be temporary.”237  Thus, anti-
trust enforcement is “at best unnecessary and at wors[t] counterpro-
ductive.”238  In Trinko, Justice Scalia acknowledged the Schumpeterian 
viewpoint, noting that “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly 
prices . . . induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.”239
However, courts have largely been unwilling to “accept a reduced 
role for antitrust.”240  Philip Weiser suggests that this reluctance “rests 
on a sound theoretical and empirical basis.”241  For example, he rec-
ognizes that “entrenched firms with monopoly power . . . will often 
decline to deploy new technologies and will seek to undermine the 
success of those that do.”242  Thus, antitrust plays “an important role” 
in protecting the entry of innovative companies, like Vonage, who “de-
ploy new technologies that will challenge the position of incumbent 
firms.”243
Second, the concern about false positives highlights the awareness 
that overzealous antitrust courts can ultimately suppress efficient prac-
tices and harm consumer welfare.244  In Trinko, as Weiser points out, 
“the Court echoed this concern by noting that ‘[t]he cost of false posi-
tives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.’”245
“regulation and antitrust aim at ‘similar goals’” (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston 
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.))). 
235 Id. at 551. 
236 Id. at 552. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004). 
240 Weiser, supra note 234, at 552. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 553; see also notes 180-186 and accompanying text (describing the risk 
that broadband providers will harm Internet application companies that threaten their 
core businesses). 
243 Weiser, supra note 234, at 553. 
244 Id. at 554.  This concern is heightened when, in the “new economy,” the poten-
tial effects of intrusion on the market “are less than clear.”  Id. 
245 Id. at 555 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)). 
  
1346 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1305 
 
On the other hand, the risk of false negatives also presents chal-
lenges.  If unchecked by antitrust principles, “monopoly firms”—such 
as broadband providers protecting their core voice or video busi-
nesses—“may well seek to slow the pace of innovation thereby ‘deny-
ing consumers the full benefits of technological progress that a dy-
namically competitive market would offer.’”246
The new economy—which includes the provision of broadband 
services and the development of Internet applications—presents both 
economic and legal challenges to regulators and courts alike.  The ar-
guments for antitrust forbearance in the new economy accurately il-
luminate the risks that an overzealous court may have on the market.  
But the risks created by not enforcing antitrust through the courts 
loom just as large.  The focus should not be on whether courts should 
apply antitrust in the new economy; rather, the focus should be on 
when and how to apply the antitrust principles.  Thus, even if antitrust 
courts should be cautious about engaging in the appropriate scrutiny, 
they continue to provide an important checking function against 
predatory conduct. 
2.  Town of Concord Principle 
When examining the role of antitrust for regulated industries, 
such as the provision of broadband, “courts and commentators have 
struggled with the challenge of ensuring that regulation and antitrust 
coexist in a harmonious” manner.247  The “Town of Concord principle” 
has emerged to define the bounds of antitrust liability when regula-
tion exists.248  According to the “discretionary version” of the princi-
ple,249 which the Trinko Court seemed to endorse,250 “the extent of an-
246 Id. at 557-58 (citing Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 673, 674 (1999)). 
247 Weiser, supra note 234, at 561. 
248 Id.; see also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991). 
249 Weiser also recognizes a “categorical version” of the Town of Concord principle, 
under which “the presence of an expert agency on the scene should restrain antitrust 
courts from evaluating whether section 2 liability should attach.”  Weiser, supra note 
234, at 562. 
250 See id. (“Trinko can best be interpreted as embracing only the discretionary ver-
sion of the Town of Concord principle.”).  In Trinko, the Supreme Court quoted Town of 
Concord for the proposition that “‘antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and re-
flect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it 
applies.’”  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 411-12 (2004) (quoting Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 22). 
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titrust restraint should vary depending on whether the regulatory re-
gime is reasonably effective at addressing the relevant anticompetitive 
conduct.”251  Thus, the Town of Concord principle “should and will be 
applied on a case by case basis” requiring “antitrust courts to make 
two preliminary judgments:  (1) ‘how well is the regulatory enterprise 
doing its job’; and (2) ‘how much confidence’ should we have that an-
titrust oversight will ‘improve competition in the situation at 
hand’?”252
In applying the Town of Concord principle in Trinko, the Supreme 
Court determined that the Telecommunications Act of 1996253 pro-
vided an “effective” level of “regulatory oversight.”254  Specifically, the 
Court stressed that where “a regulatory structure designed to deter 
and remedy anticompetitive harm . . . exists, the additional benefit to 
competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, 
and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such 
additional scrutiny.”255  In assessing the Act, the Court highlighted a 
section granting the FCC authority for the “imposition of penalties” in 
the event of anticompetitive conduct.256  Thus, the Supreme Court 
concluded that, in this case, the “benefits of antitrust intervention” 
were “slight” and ultimately held that the respondent failed to state a 
claim under the Sherman Act.257
In contrast to the Telecommunications Act’s regulation of tradi-
tional phone service that was at issue in Trinko, the regulation of 
broadband services and Internet applications has been significantly 
reduced.258  Although the FCC has taken action when an Internet ap-
plication was blocked,259 it remains noncommittal toward an official 
policy regarding pay-to-play.260  In addition, the present form of the 
251 Weiser, supra note 234, at 562. 
252 Id. at 568 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 353-54). 
253 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
254 Id. at 564. 
255 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412. 
256 Id. at 413; Weiser, supra note 234, at 565. 
257 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-16; Weiser, supra note 234, at 565. 
258 See supra Part III.A (discussing the “lighter regulatory touch” by the FCC in the 
market for broadband Internet access). 
259 See ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 46, at 3 (noting that the FCC “act[ed] to 
ban the blocking of Vonage’s [VoIP] service by Madison River Communications”); see 
also supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text (describing Madison River Communi-
cations’s attempt to block Vonage’s VoIP service). 
260 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing FCC Chairman Martin’s 
statements regarding pay-to-play). 
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COPE Act would provide a toothless antitrust enforcement mecha-
nism.261  Thus, the FCC is unlikely to effectively address anticompeti-
tive conduct by broadband providers. 
The next step under a Town of Concord analysis entails evaluating 
whether antitrust enforcement would “improve the competition in the 
situation at hand.”262  Thus, the focus should turn to available reme-
dies.  This Comment next discusses the remedies that antitrust courts 
have at their disposal. 
3.  Remedies 
Antitrust remedies play an important role in both regulated and 
unregulated industries.263  However, in some situations, “antitrust law 
should refrain from providing relief.”264  For example, some cases may 
be identified as “irremedial because they would require certain judg-
ments . . . that are outside the competence of antitrust courts.”265  In 
Trinko, the Court enthusiastically quoted Phillip Areeda’s analysis that 
“‘[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or 
adequately and reasonably supervise.  The problem should be deemed 
irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the 
court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory 
agency.’”266  Thus, in the duty-to-deal context, a court must be able to 
“provide meaningful relief without undertaking the role of a regula-
tory agency.”267
261 See discussion supra note 71.  The maximum penalty for a violation of the FCC’s 
broadband policy statement would be a mere $500,000, and the FCC would be without 
authority to “adopt or implement rules or regulations regarding enforcement of the 
broadband policy statement.”  H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006). 
262 See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
263 See Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Reme-
dies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“[T]he availability of an antitrust remedy provides 
an important safety valve for and a backstop to the regulatory regime.”). 
264 Id. at 9-10 (describing, under the Town of Concord principle, “three types of 
cases involving regulated entities where antitrust law should refrain from providing 
relief”). 
265 Id. at 10.  Instead, such judgments are often “within the core province of regu-
latory agencies.”  Id. 
266 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
415 (2004) (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:  An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58  ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989) (alteration in original)). 
267 Weiser, supra note 263, at 15. 
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According to Philip Weiser, there are several alternate approaches 
that would enable an antitrust court to provide such “meaningful re-
lief.” 
First, courts can rely on a prior course of dealing to provide re-
lief.268  As discussed above, in Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court relied 
in part upon the prior course of dealing in affirming a treble damages 
verdict.269  Weiser cautions, though, that such a remedy may be inade-
quate in fast-moving technology markets.270  As a result, when relying 
upon a prior course of conduct in the provision of broadband ser-
vices, courts should be aware of market changes before determining 
the baseline for relief. 
Second, Weiser explains, courts can rely on “an arrangement or 
industry custom regulated by a regulatory agency” in crafting a rem-
edy.271  In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court pro-
vided relief that was to be enforced by a regulatory agency instead of 
by the court.272  Thus, the Otter Tail approach allowed the Court to ad-
judicate an important antitrust case and “award relief without becom-
ing mired in the day-to-day administration of a conduct remedy that a 
regulatory agency can better monitor.”273
Third, courts can rely on a “non-discrimination standard whereby 
a company gives its competitor access to a facility on the same terms 
and conditions as it gives itself or a preferred customer.”274  This stan-
dard accounts for dynamic pricing schedules in an industry by setting 
a “moving benchmark for an access right.”275  In the broadband pro-
vider context, a court would have to compartmentalize a provider’s 
broadband service division and VoIP division and identify the transfer 
268 Id. at 18-20. 
269 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the prior course of deal-
ing in Aspen Skiing). 
270 Weiser, supra note 263, at 18-19.  Weiser also cautions courts to consider that a 
remedy based on a prior course of dealing “levies a tax on a firm’s prior willingness to 
deal (by punishing its subsequent change) and thus may deter valuable experimenta-
tion in future business strategies.”  Id. at 19. 
271 Id. at 15. 
272 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973) (affirming a district court decree requiring the de-
fendant to supply services “at rates which are compensatory and under terms and con-
ditions which are filed with and subject to approval by the Federal Power Commis-
sion”).  In Otter Tail, the regulatory agency did not have the explicit statutory 
authorization to mandate the antitrust remedy itself.  Id. at 373-76.  However, the 
commission did have the capability to supervise and enforce such a remedy.  Id. 
273 Weiser, supra note 263, at 16. 
274 Id. at 15. 
275 Id. at 20. 
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price276 charged by the former to the latter.277  A judicial remedy based 
on a nondiscriminatory standard would require the broadband pro-
vider to charge Internet application companies the same rate.278
Thus, in the context of broadband services and Internet applica-
tions (and the new economy generally), antitrust courts can effectively 
counteract anticompetitive actions through a variety of remedial op-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
Broadband providers compete directly with some Internet appli-
cations.  Based on competition on the merits—for example, brand 
power and bundled offerings—broadband providers often drive many 
independent application providers from the market.  However, the 
proposed pay-to-play system is unreasonably tilting the competitive 
Internet application landscape toward broadband providers’ control. 
By imposing a passage fee on any time-sensitive application to en-
sure priority delivery, broadband providers would violate NN princi-
ples as well as the antitrust law.  NN principles seek to create a struc-
tural bias favoring entry of any player into the market for Internet 
applications.  A pay-to-play system would impose significant barriers to 
entry for Internet application companies that provide a time-sensitive 
product.  Thus, such a system would create a disincentive to innovate 
on the most dynamic portion of the network:  the “ends.” 
Under Supreme Court precedent established in Aspen Skiing and 
in Kodak, the pay-to-play system is effectively a refusal to deal with ri-
vals.  A monopolist’s action of closing a previously open platform 
without a legitimate business justification may be grounds for antitrust 
liability.  Two of the three proffered justifications for the pay-to-play 
policy—the prevention of  free riding and a lack of economic incen-
tive to exclude—are not “legitimate” under case law and economic 
theory.  The third justification offered—ensuring quality service—
though arguably pretextual, might constitute a business justification.  
276 A transfer price is the price at which one division of the company sells its prod-
uct or service to another division of the company.  See W. BRUCE ALLEN ET AL., MANA-
GERIAL ECONOMICS:  THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CASES 516 (6th ed. 2005) (describing 
the meaning and importance of transfer pricing). 
277 An accountant can easily calculate the internal cost under the auspices of the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
278 See Weiser, supra note 263, at 20 (“In practice, this often means identifying pre-
ferred customers—or internal division of its own operations—and ensuring that the 
would-be-discriminated against party obtains the same treatment.”). 
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Nonetheless, under a rule-of-reason analysis that balances procom-
petitive benefits with anticompetitive harms, the pay-to-play system 
fails to withstand antitrust scrutiny.  The same benefits could be at-
tained in a manner that is less restrictive and harmful to competition. 
In the next decade, consumers likely will witness greater competi-
tion in the provision of broadband services.  The FCC has presently 
taken a “lighter regulatory touch” in order to spur a market entry of 
satellite, WiFi, 3G or 4G, and power line broadband to break up the 
cable/DSL broadband duopoly.279  In a marketplace that offers this 
degree of consumer flexibility, a pay-to-play system would not be an 
effective anticompetitive device. 
However, the industry has not yet reached this competitive ideal.  
DSL providers have signaled their desire to use their market power in 
the last mile to extinguish their smaller VoIP rivals.  Cable broadband 
providers have the same incentives to crush an Internet application 
that delivers video programming.  In this period between deregula-
tion and the competitive ideal, it is important to have a case-by-case 
approach to address anticompetitive actions.  Articulating an antitrust 
framework for liability is crucial to maintaining innovation in the near 
future. 
Farrell and Weiser recommend that the FCC take an “antitrust-
like” approach to regulation in order to avoid vertical competitive 
harms before they occur.280  Although this approach has significant 
merit281 and could successfully implement the principles articulated in 
this Comment, the FCC currently has taken a “lighter-touch” ap-
proach.  Thus, in the absence of effective regulation, a clear articula-
tion of potential antitrust liability for a pay-to-play system may deter 
such future conduct.  It is critical to articulate such liability in the 
courts today. 
 
279 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,222 (Oct. 17, 2005) (final rule) (indicating the FCC’s new 
framework for wireline broadband Internet access service). 
280 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 133. 
281 For example, it would allow the FCC to articulate principles and provide busi-
nesses with valuable determinacy in a set of ground rules.  See Jonathan E. Nuechter-
lein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of Telecommunications Act of 
1996, at 24 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03, 
2003) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=707124 (describing the importance to 
businesses of having determinate behavioral ground rules). 
